Published December 10, 2012 | By Nate Haken, Filipa Carreira, Elizaveta Egorova, Rachel Hersh

Not every explosion in northern Nigeria stems from the radicalism of Boko Haram. Nor is every outbreak of violence in the Niger Delta the result of militants fighting over oil revenues. Rather, violence in its different forms is an expression of a broader and deeper fabric of social, economic, political, and security challenges. Given the wrong set of underlying conditions, collective violence can spark seemingly out of nowhere, whether or not there is a formal paramilitary group active in the region. Even when such organizations do not exist, in an area with past and current episodes of insecurity, latent structures may still be there, to be crystallized at a moments notice--in the event of a political contest, land dispute, turf warfare, or chieftaincy tussle.  Violence can sometimes be self-organizing.  Just add water.

The government’s amnesty program in the Niger Delta has been partially successful. Attacks by militants on oil facilities and state assets have been much reduced. However, since 2009, organized insurgency in the Niger Delta has morphed into a situation of general lawlessness — abductions, murders, gang violence, intra-communal violence, land disputes, mob justice, and political thuggery. Meanwhile, in the North, ethnic and sectarian violence has polarized communities causing some to migrate into religious enclaves out of fear. During the period of May-October 2012, there were bombings in Kaduna and large scale communal violence in Plateau. In addition to the shifting patterns of violence in the North and the South, there were also devastating floods — Nigeria’s worst in 40 years — which further exacerbated pressure on the state’s ability to manage conflict risk.

Published June 27, 2012 | By Nate Haken, Natalie Manning, Megan Turner, Amelia Whitehead

As Goodluck Jonathan begins his new term as President of Nigeria, he faces many challenges. Even as a fragile peace takes hold in the Niger Delta, gang violence and criminality continue unabated. In the North, Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group, continues to wreak havoc. Though the government has taken some steps towards strengthening the democratic process, instances of corruption and vote rigging have been reported at the state and local levels over the past seven months. The Nigerian government, civil society, and other stakeholders must take steps to address these governance and security issues, or risk further instability in the future.

This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society representatives in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network from October 2011 to April 2012, with a particular focus on the state and local government area levels of Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta and Kaduna.

Incidents and issues summarized here include election irregularities surrounding gubernatorial elections, such as political corruption and intimidation, as well as social and economic pressures relating to land competition, group grievance and violent crime. These incidents and issues are categorized according to the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) framework, which allows for a holistic evaluation of the pressures on society and the state that could increase the risk of instability.

Published November 30, 2011 | By Annie Janus and Raphaël Jaeger

Despite several notable improvements, many deep-seated issues continue to threaten Nigeria’s stability. Significant efforts to prevent fraud in the 2011 election nevertheless failed to prevent the eruption of post-election violence, which also plagued the 2003 and 2007 elections. Moreover, the 2011 elections exacerbated north-south religious and ethnic tensions, leaving the state vulnerable to further internal conflict. Inadequate healthcare, uneven distribution of wealth, and corruption also continue to undermine state capacity. President Goodluck Jonathan has promulgated his anti-corruption commitment, but the pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria will make this a difficult task. Since most inter-communal conflicts are rooted in struggles for food, jobs, and land, economic reforms will be needed to mitigate these sources of instability.

Published October 28, 2011 | By Nate Haken, Tierney Anderson, Julie Andrus, Erin Crandell

Nigeria’s election in April 2011 represented a huge step forward with respect to democratization. However, there was significant resistance on the part of vested interests, which led to an escalation of many conflict risk factors at the local and national levels in the subsequent five months. Nigerian stakeholders in government, civil society, and private sectors must not rest on their laurels after this relatively successful election. Doing so would risk losing all that has been gained.

This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society representatives in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network from April -September 2011, with a particular focus on the state and local government area levels of Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Kaduna. There is a two month period of overlap between this report and the last, which covered December 2010-May 2011. The reason for this overlap is that UNLocK participants met in September for a workshop, adding considerably to the data compiled on events in April and May. Rather than archive that newly collected data, we wanted to include it in this report for a fuller picture of the landscape as perceived by the early warning network.

Publication CR-11-18-UL
Published June 22, 2011
By Nate Haken, Annie Janus

Nigeria’s national and state elections, held in April of this year were rightly praised as the freest and fairest of Nigeria’s history. But that success was not necessarily tangible to everyone on the ground. As reported by local civil society organizations in the UNLocK early warning network, there were significant problems before, during, and after the elections, including ballot box snatching, vote buying, and a lot of political violence. These ongoing problems need to be recognized and addressed for this successful election to be consolidated as a turning point for democracy in Nigeria.

June 20, 2011
By Joelle Burbank
The Failed States Index

This will be the year of the African election, with 27 countries scheduled to choose their presidential, legislative or local leadership at the polls. Elections can be tumultuous times, particularly in conflict-affected countries, as demonstrated in recent years in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere. Given the challenges inherent in democratization, this year’s elections in Africa are being watched very closely. Here is a glimpse at a few of the African countries that have recently held, or are planning to hold, presidential elections this year and how they fared on the Failed States Index.

May 3, 2011
By Kenneth C. Brill and Nate Haken
The Fund for Peace Commentary

Compared to past Nigerian elections, this one was relatively free and fair. Now the hard work begins for President Goodluck Jonathan. In the North, post election violence has killed over 100 people and displaced thousands. But the real worry, in many ways, is the situation in the South. Indeed, whether Nigeria slides inexorably towards state failure or joins the world’s emerging powers will be determined in the Niger Delta, the heart of the nation’s oil economy. Nigeria’s oil exports matter to Nigeria—they account for more than 80% of government revenue. Nigeria, as an oil producer matters to the world—it is the fourth largest exporter worldwide. The absence of sustainable development and security in the Niger Delta could impact the price of gas at the pump and the pace of the global economic recovery.

Publication CR-11-09-UL
Report available in PDF and Flash formats

During the period covered by this report (August-November 2010) the election season was getting under way. This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network, with a particular focus on the state and local levels in the Niger Delta region. According to these incident reports, candidates reportedly engaged in intimidation against their opponents. Candidates and their family member were kidnapped or killed. Criminal and vigilante elements were reportedly co-opted or recruited for political reasons. Officials were accused of corruption. The government’s rebel amnesty program continued to falter due in part to ambiguity and controversy over who is eligible to participate. Floods destroyed homes and poverty.

Published December 15, 2010 | By Dr. Pauline Baker, Nate Haken, Will Ferroggiaro

This report—Can Nigeria Achieve Unity in Diversity?—is the first in a series of papers examining how different countries manage ethnic, racial, religious, or other identities in order to prevent conflict leading to mass atrocities and genocide. The paper examines Nigeria’s political institutions, legal structures, and policy initiatives to address the issues arising from its complex society.

Several measures were adopted to encourage broad political inclusion and reduce the potential for conflict. First, Nigeria has created additional states from its original four regionally-based states in order to decentralize power to avoid secessionist movements and respond to demands for statehood from minorities. Second, a constitutional provision was established requiring “the federal character” to be reflected through state representation at the center through the “federal character” principle, which requires the national cabinet to include at least one minister from each of the 36 states. At the local level, the constitution provided for a preference for “indigenes” (by custom, this refers to those whose ancestors were original inhabitants of the community) over “non-indigenes” (those who migrated, or whose ancestors migrated, to the area). These designations affect the allocation of land, jobs, education, and political appointments. Third, an informal “power shifting” practice (sometimes referred to as the “zoning” or “rotational” rule) was adopted for the presidential nomination process of the dominant political party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It requires presidential nominees to rotate between Southerners and Northerners at least once every two terms (or eight years). Fourth, the electoral system was amended to discourage ethnic voting and secessionist tendencies. It requires, in addition to the popular vote, that a presidential candidate has to receive one-quarter of the votes cast in two-thirds of the states plus the federal capital to be declared a winner. On the surface, this provision appears to establish a government based on a broad mandate; in practice, it encourages political parties to pressure local agents to record winning votes in their areas at any cost. This requirement has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in elections, undermining political legitimacy, and generating public cynicism about elections generally. Finally, the positive effects that might have emerged from these efforts to foster political inclusion were undermined by a steady trend toward political centralization that emerged during approximately three decades of military rule.

In sum, the Nigerian experience shows the weakness of stressing form over function in managing diversity. Nigeria’s challenges in integrating ethnic, regional and religious identities into a framework based on national unity remain. Indeed, Nigeria could fragment again, and particular groups could again become targets of mass atrocities.

This paper and subsequent papers are produced by The Fund for Peace working with the cooperation of the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in order to assist the Special Adviser in his early warning and prevention efforts. The mandate of the Special Adviser is to make recommendations to the Secretary-General and through him, the United Nations Security Council, to prevent genocide, and to inform and educate opinion leaders and policy makers on how to recognize and prevent potential genocides. In support of the Office, the FfP is producing this series of objective case studies that identify the factors for identity conflict as well as government actions that either exacerbate or mitigate identity-related conflict. The primary goal of the papers is to identify best practices in how countries addressed identity and fostered inclusion so as to avoid such conflict.

The concept and modalities for the series of papers, as well as the countries to be examined, were jointly agreed between FfP and OSAPG. The papers employ the OSAPG Analysis Framework as a central lens on the issues. Drafts of the papers are peer reviewed by an independent expert reviewer chosen by FfP, a senior UN official, and OSAPG. The Fund for Peace finalizes the papers for dissemination within the UN system and to a broader public audience. This initiative has been generously supported by Humanity United, while the series of dialogues on the papers is supported by The Stanley Foundation.

The principal author of this paper is Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President Emeritus of The Fund for Peace. Senior Associates Will Ferroggiaro and Nate Haken contributed drafting, editing, and research, and FfP Intern Shane Hensinger assisted in production of the report. It was reviewed by John Campbell (U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria 2004-2007); a senior UN Department of Political Affairs official; and the Special Adviser and his staff. However, the views contained herein are solely those of The Fund for Peace.