Library: Nuclear

Meltdown in Japan

Published June 18, 2012 | By Felipe Umaña

The year 2011 was a difficult one for Japan. On March 11, the 9.0-magnitude T?hoku earthquake struck the northeastern coast of Japan, triggering a powerful tsunami that left destruction in its wake as it traveled over five miles inland. Numerous landslides occurred in the countryside and several large-scale nuclear meltdowns were reported in a number of nuclear facilities that were found to be unprepared for the strength of the waves. In the resulting calamity, the government of Japan was forced to declare a state of emergency and focus its first response teams on the afflicted northeastern areas.

Because of the extensive damage, the T?hoku earthquake and its associated disasters have quickly become the world’s single most expensive natural disaster incident in history, with costs estimated to be over USD $200 billion. Although Japan has implemented a large-scale and successful rebuilding program, the nation’s full recovery will take some time due to the severity of the destruction.

The impact of the earthquake was felt sharply in Japan’s Failed States Index score for 2011, with the country registering the second-largest year-on-year “worsening” in the history of the Index. The country’s Demographic Pressures indicator score dropped by 4.7 points in this year’s Index, consistent with the intensity of the temblors and tsunami. Though the main destruction occurred in the northeastern region of Japan and thus affected only a section of the population, the complete decimation of hundreds of thousands of homes and the subsequent uprooting of thousands of men, women, and children from their domiciles heavily deteriorated the previously stable demographic conditions. The increase in population displacement and the rush to accommodate those affected also worsened the country’s Refugee and IDP score, showing an increase of 2.9 points. Similarly, the Poverty and Economic Decline score suffered a 0.5 point uptick due to the economic hardships associated with the natural disaster and its effect on the country’s productivity.

Crime & Terrorism in the Tri-Border Area

Published April 11, 2012 | By Felipe Umaña

The Tri-Border Area is formed by the junction of three different cities: Puerto Iguazú, Argentina; Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil; and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. Located in the eastern-central part of the Southern Cone in South America, the triple frontier region is known for its impressive Iguaçu Falls – a group of cataracts that draw over 700,000 tourists each year – and other natural sites throughout the the Iguazú National Park. The region is also notable for being the home of the world’s largest hydroelectric plant, the Itaipu Dam.

Demographically, the area is very ethnically diverse. In addition to the native Paraguayans, Brazilians, and Argentine populations, there are also substantial pockets of people of Chinese, Colombian, Iranian, Italian, Korean, Lebanese, Palestinian, Taiwanese, and Ukrainian descent. The triple frontier boasts a large Arab minority presence of around 10,000 and 75,000 people, mostly from Lebanon and Palestine.

Of the three cities that form the Tri-Border Area, Ciudad del Este is the largest and busiest, serving as the region’s economic center. Its streets are regularly clogged with street merchants, shoppers, cambistas (informal currency exchangers), and others that help fuel its burgeoning economy. In fact, Ciudad del Este has ranked third worldwide in cash transactions, averaging well over US$12 billion annually in the early 2000s.2 Foz do Iguaçu, which boasts some of the region’s most frequented tourist destinations (including Latin America’s largest mosque), is the second largest city. Puerto Iguazú rounds out the trio in terms of population size.

Guiding Principles & Nuclear Proliferation

Published February 15, 2012 | By Ed Nagle

Not long after the dawn of the nuclear age, few experts were optimistic that the spread of nuclear weapons could be contained. In 1963 it was anticipated that fifteen to twenty nations would likely come to possess nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear power, by the 1970s.1 It is easy to lose sight of this in contemporary discussions on nuclear proliferation. Yet at present we are faced with renewed pressure from state and non-state actors who desire to acquire nuclear arms. The apparent success of North Korea and potential success of Iran have created new regional pressures that have the potential to greatly increase the number of nuclear weapons states to a point not unlike President John F. Kennedy’s grim prediction in 1963. The years since the end of the Cold War have seen not only a transformation of the security environment, but also an evolution in the means and motives for procuring nuclear arms.

Profile: The Haqqani Network

Published October 14, 2011 | By Kendall Lawrence

The Haqqani Network is an insurgent group that operates from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan. The group has been active mainly in the southeast of Afghanistan—in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni Wardak and, occasionally, Kabul provinces. For the past two years, the group has focused on gaining support and control of Kurram Agency, a province of Pakistan not far from Kabul, which is mostly beyond the scope of U.S. drone activity. It is led by Siraj Haqqani, the son of the network’s founder, the famous anti-Soviet fighter and former CIA asset, Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Network falls under the larger umbrella of the Taliban, although they maintain their own command and control structures.

Threat Convergence in South Asia

Published October 14, 2011 | By Ryan Costello and Ed Nagle

Revelations from the 2004 exposure of the A. Q. Khan network have highlighted the importance of this region in global nonproliferation efforts. While terrorism is by no means constrained to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the confluence of intent, knowledge and materials is found in this region. It remains uncertain if all nodes of the Khan network have been identified. Other leading Pakistani scient ist s have demonstrated a willingness to share nuclear knowledge if not material capabilities. The diversity of suppliers in quantity, location and specialty has made confirmation tentative at best. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is extensive and ongoing. The infrastructure that enabled Khan’s prolonged success remains in place. In addition, the intentions of individual members of Pakistan’s intelligence and military leadership have been called into question as a result of revelations regarding Bin Laden’s death.

North Korean WMD Trading Relationships

Published April 26, 2011 | By Jonas Vaicikonis

North Korea threatens world security by hastening the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies to state and non-state actors interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. The North uses two pathways to acquire banned nuclear equipment for itself and for others: through state-to-state contact and through its network of individuals engaged in illicit trade. Both pathways pose a danger to the international community, but it is increasingly North Korea’s collaborations with other states interested in nuclear weapons technology that threaten the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea’s unscrupulous history of selling narcotics, counterfeiting currency, and selling arms does not encourage optimism in its willingness to refrain from spreading nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, the examples in this paper demonstrate that North Korea’s relationships with Pakistan, Syria, and Iran have advanced the nuclear programs of all four states, despite United Nation’s sanctions.

Briefing: Nuclear Meltdowns

Published April 19, 2011 | By Ryan Costello

Concerns regarding the safety of nuclear energy, particularly after the meltdowns at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, have hindered its continued development over the past few decades. However, increasing energy demand and fears of climate change have led to a “nuclear renaissance” in which states have increasingly pursued nuclear power as a carbon-free energy source.1 Given the evolving nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, the future of nuclear energy is once again in doubt because of concerns about safety and health risks. When discussing the potential hazards of nuclear power, it is useful to bear in mind the cost of burning fossil fuels, such as coal. The burning of coal is a primary contributor to global warming, and it emits numerous hazardous air pollutants that likely result in thousands of deaths annually. Furthermore, around the globe thousands of coal miners die each year in mine accidents.2 Thus, the death toll from fossil fuels is higher than that of nuclear power.

Briefing: The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Power

Published March 29, 2011 | By Ryan Costello

The ongoing crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station has renewed international concern regarding the safety of nuclear energy. In Germany, domestic pressure has forced Chancellor Angela Merkel to temporarily close seven of the nation’s seventeen nuclear power plants. In addition, China has announced that it will suspend new plant approvals until safety regulations are reviewed. On the other hand, France, which relies on nuclear energy to provide nearly eighty percent of the country’s electricity, has not indicated that it will take any steps to limit production at its nuclear plants.1 To date, there are thirty countries operating nuclear power reactors worldwide and approximately twenty others have expressed an interest in building nuclear reactors for the generation of electricity. Therefore, as nations around the world reexamine their nuclear energy policies, it is helpful to examine the pros and cons of nuclear power.

Threat Convergence in Pakistan

Published February 1, 2011 | By Ryan Costello

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a significant proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating within the country and in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of state instability and fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the government and Islamist militants. The possibility that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials, either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with internal assistance, should not be underestimated.

Sustainable Nuclear Security: A Holistic Approach

Journal of Threat Convergence, Vol. 1, No. 1 - Fall 2010 | By Dr. Elizabeth (Libby) Turpen

With the laudable goal of addressing “all vulnerable materials” in his first term, the Obama administration hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in April 2010. The NSS resulted in a communiqué which affirms President Obama’s four year global lockdown goal and commits participants to a Work Plan detailing the various initiatives and activities which this effort will encompass. Although it is clear from the verbiage set forth in the Summit Communiqué and the Work Plan that the negotiators clearly understand the multi-faceted nature of ensuring the lockdown is sustainable, the need is still dire to view the nuclear security challenge as an issue of materials, technology, and know-how governance. This will require bridging the gap between the nuclear nonproliferation community, whose efforts have been more focused on guards, guns, and gates to mitigate the risk of diversion, and the development community, whose decades of lessons learned in providing assistance should be culled for their pertinence to the nonproliferation community’s efforts in achieving rapid lockdown in a holistic, and therefore, sustainable manner.

Engaging Non-State Actors in Zones of Competing Governance

Journal of Threat Convergence, Vol. 1, No. 1 - Fall 2010 | By Dr. James J.F. Forest

This article examines the socio-political dynamics of local governance within weak states, with particular focus on places that are governed by non-state entities. State weakness is a prime concern for threat convergence, and so-called “ungoverned territories” are central to this concern. However, in many cases this term is mis-applied to describe areas where there is in fact a form of governance, places where security and stability are maintained through a deeply-rooted hierarchy of loyalties and traditions. Several research and policy implications are drawn from this perspective. First, we must recognize the potentially counterproductive state-centric bias inherent in labeling certain places “ungoverned spaces”; rather, we should acknowledge that there are local non-state governance structures that in many cases are functioning effectively and are perceived by local inhabitants as having more legitimacy than the central government. In essence, there are places in the world which could be termed, “zones of competing governance,” in which an intense competition for loyalty takes place between local entities and the central government. We must strive to gain a better understanding of these places and the local non-state governance structures within them through research that transcends a variety of academic disciplines. Improved knowledge about the dynamics of zones of competing governance will then allow us to work toward converting them into zones of complementary or cooperative governance, where the mutual interests of local governance structures and the central government (including security, stability and a sustainable economy) can be achieved.

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