Library: Terrorism

Transnational Security Threats in the Straits of Malacca

Published August 23, 2012 | By Felipe Umaña

The Straits of Malacca consist of a narrow but lengthy waterway that extends more than 500 miles from the eastern limits of the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Straddling the sea route between the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Thai-Malay Peninsula, and the small city-state of Singapore, the Straits of Malacca are known globally for their economic, political, environmental, and strategic importance. The Straits themselves link the Indian Ocean to some of Asia’s most powerful economies, as well as many other trade-influential countries, like the United States, Germany, and Russia.

More than 60,000 vessels traverse the critical chokepoint per year, carrying more than a third of global trade. Due to the amount of traffic, the region is also home to some of the busiest ports in the world, particularly in Singapore. The Straits attract foreign investment with the amount of commerce and trade it supports. The Straits are also the focal point of legal and political issues, such as the sovereignty of territorial waters and the responsibility to secure the waterway. Likewise, the waterway is a source of environmental concern for the littoral countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The maintenance of the environment is important to all three states in order to not deter tourism or development projects in the area, both of which can in turn influence the economic and political sectors directly. Finally, the Straits are crucial for worldwide communication and resource exchange, making them internationally significant.

Crime & Terrorism in the Tri-Border Area

Published April 11, 2012 | By Felipe Umaña

The Tri-Border Area is formed by the junction of three different cities: Puerto Iguazú, Argentina; Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil; and Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. Located in the eastern-central part of the Southern Cone in South America, the triple frontier region is known for its impressive Iguaçu Falls – a group of cataracts that draw over 700,000 tourists each year – and other natural sites throughout the the Iguazú National Park. The region is also notable for being the home of the world’s largest hydroelectric plant, the Itaipu Dam.

Demographically, the area is very ethnically diverse. In addition to the native Paraguayans, Brazilians, and Argentine populations, there are also substantial pockets of people of Chinese, Colombian, Iranian, Italian, Korean, Lebanese, Palestinian, Taiwanese, and Ukrainian descent. The triple frontier boasts a large Arab minority presence of around 10,000 and 75,000 people, mostly from Lebanon and Palestine.

Of the three cities that form the Tri-Border Area, Ciudad del Este is the largest and busiest, serving as the region’s economic center. Its streets are regularly clogged with street merchants, shoppers, cambistas (informal currency exchangers), and others that help fuel its burgeoning economy. In fact, Ciudad del Este has ranked third worldwide in cash transactions, averaging well over US$12 billion annually in the early 2000s.2 Foz do Iguaçu, which boasts some of the region’s most frequented tourist destinations (including Latin America’s largest mosque), is the second largest city. Puerto Iguazú rounds out the trio in terms of population size.

Guiding Principles & Nuclear Proliferation

Published February 15, 2012 | By Ed Nagle

Not long after the dawn of the nuclear age, few experts were optimistic that the spread of nuclear weapons could be contained. In 1963 it was anticipated that fifteen to twenty nations would likely come to possess nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear power, by the 1970s.1 It is easy to lose sight of this in contemporary discussions on nuclear proliferation. Yet at present we are faced with renewed pressure from state and non-state actors who desire to acquire nuclear arms. The apparent success of North Korea and potential success of Iran have created new regional pressures that have the potential to greatly increase the number of nuclear weapons states to a point not unlike President John F. Kennedy’s grim prediction in 1963. The years since the end of the Cold War have seen not only a transformation of the security environment, but also an evolution in the means and motives for procuring nuclear arms.

Profile: The Haqqani Network

Published October 14, 2011 | By Kendall Lawrence

The Haqqani Network is an insurgent group that operates from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan. The group has been active mainly in the southeast of Afghanistan—in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni Wardak and, occasionally, Kabul provinces. For the past two years, the group has focused on gaining support and control of Kurram Agency, a province of Pakistan not far from Kabul, which is mostly beyond the scope of U.S. drone activity. It is led by Siraj Haqqani, the son of the network’s founder, the famous anti-Soviet fighter and former CIA asset, Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Network falls under the larger umbrella of the Taliban, although they maintain their own command and control structures.

Threat Convergence in South Asia

Published October 14, 2011 | By Ryan Costello and Ed Nagle

Revelations from the 2004 exposure of the A. Q. Khan network have highlighted the importance of this region in global nonproliferation efforts. While terrorism is by no means constrained to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the confluence of intent, knowledge and materials is found in this region. It remains uncertain if all nodes of the Khan network have been identified. Other leading Pakistani scient ist s have demonstrated a willingness to share nuclear knowledge if not material capabilities. The diversity of suppliers in quantity, location and specialty has made confirmation tentative at best. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is extensive and ongoing. The infrastructure that enabled Khan’s prolonged success remains in place. In addition, the intentions of individual members of Pakistan’s intelligence and military leadership have been called into question as a result of revelations regarding Bin Laden’s death.

Profile: Al-Shabaab and the Somalia Food Crisis

Published September 1, 2011 | By Annie Janus and Kendall Lawrence

Al Shabaab, a hard-line militia group, controls most of southern Somalia and, until recently, a large swath of Mogadishu. Though the exact origins of al-Shabaab are unknown, most scholars believe that the group started as a military faction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which took over Mogadishu and large parts of the south after intense factionalized fighting in 2006. Al-Shabaab has waged an insurgency against Somalia's transitional federal government (TFG) and its Ethiopian supporters over the past five years. The full name of the group is Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) meaning ‘Movement of Striving Youth.’ The fighters are a mix of local and foreign youth, attracted to the group by its claims to be the defenders of Somali dignity from outside invaders while it also calls for a broader global jihad.

North Korean WMD Trading Relationships

Published April 26, 2011 | By Jonas Vaicikonis

North Korea threatens world security by hastening the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies to state and non-state actors interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. The North uses two pathways to acquire banned nuclear equipment for itself and for others: through state-to-state contact and through its network of individuals engaged in illicit trade. Both pathways pose a danger to the international community, but it is increasingly North Korea’s collaborations with other states interested in nuclear weapons technology that threaten the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea’s unscrupulous history of selling narcotics, counterfeiting currency, and selling arms does not encourage optimism in its willingness to refrain from spreading nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, the examples in this paper demonstrate that North Korea’s relationships with Pakistan, Syria, and Iran have advanced the nuclear programs of all four states, despite United Nation’s sanctions.

Threat Convergence in Pakistan

Published February 1, 2011 | By Ryan Costello

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a significant proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating within the country and in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of state instability and fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the government and Islamist militants. The possibility that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials, either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with internal assistance, should not be underestimated.

Cybercrime and the Risk of Proliferation Finance

Published August 15, 2010 | By Alexandra Kapitanskaya

In much the same way that ungoverned regions of the world pose significant risks to global security and nonproliferation efforts, ungoverned swathes of cyberspace contain inherent security vulnerabilities which offer criminals opportunity to conduct illicit activities through the use of information technology (IT).

The rapid growth of IT and its spread around the world has facilitated international trade, finance, communication and human development, offering new opportunities for the exchange of goods, services and ideas. However, the requisite measures to ensure that the IT medium would not be exploited by criminals and terrorists for financial and political gain have been slow to arrive and, in many cases, simply have not been considered a priority for national governments, international organizations and the private sector. The result of this approach has been a marked rise in serious crime committed with the help of modern technology: of the more than 55,000 instances of wire fraud committed since 1998 in the United States, over half have occurred over the past two years in cyberspace.

The Crime-Terrorism Nexus: Risks in the Tri-Border Area

Published May 1, 2009 | By Patricia Taft, David Poplack and Rita Grossman-Vermaas

The FfP found that existing regional criminal networks in the Tri-Border Area have the potential to facilitate acts of WMD terrorism through: formal and informal financial networks, communications infrastructure, the provision of safe havens and identity “laundering,” and tested routes for the smuggling of personnel and materials throughout the hemisphere. Therefore, the Tri-Border Area may offer a rich enabling environment that could support a WMD terrorism scenario anywhere in the world—one characterized by corruption; gaps in the capacities of state intelligence, border security, and immigration control services; large legitimate economies and trading networks; sophisticated nuclear technology and expertise; and the presence of transnational criminal networks that overlap with the membership and activities of radical movements and terrorist elements.

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