July 15, 2011
By Nate Haken
The Fund for Peace Commentary

I have a map of Uganda on my office wall. I put little red stickers on it whenever there are incidents of land conflict, clashes between armed groups, or cases of civil unrest. My map is getting cluttered and difficult to read.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected by a landslide in February. Now, he has a very difficult job ahead of him. Certainly, the aging military man has shown himself to be a strong leader ever since he came to power in 1987. Early in his tenure, he was widely praised for guiding Uganda through a period of difficult economic reform. Though it took almost 20 years, he finally pushed the Lord’s Resistance Army out of Northern Uganda. Under Museveni, Uganda has been a leader in the fight against AIDS. The same is true with respect to the fight against terrorism, especially in Somalia.

Published July 8, 2011 | By J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Joelle Burbank and Kendall Lawrence

As a result of the January 2011 referendum for independence, South Sudan formally declared its autonomy from the Republic of Sudan on July 9. Amid the celebration, there is growing recognition that from the start, the world’s newest country is guaranteed to face enormous pressures both from within its territory and from across the border. Testing its legitimacy, the Government of South Sudan will face the challenge of accommodating minority groups struggling for representation and power within the new structure. At the same time, the state will need to establish control over the entire territory without violating the human rights of those groups which are loathe to integrate politically and militarily. Border skirmishes between the SPLA and northern forces are likely, which could implicate affinity groups that straddle both countries, further complicating the internal pressures cited above.  Disputes with the Republic of Sudan over oil revenues could prove combustible, with implications for development and security in South Sudan. These political and security issues will occur in the context of ethnic tensions, poverty, drought, disease, population displacement, rudimentary infrastructure, and inadequate essential service delivery.  It will take much work and support for the Republic of South Sudan to succeed.

Publication CR-11-19-UL
Published June 30, 2011
By Nate Haken, Kendall Lawrence

Despite a relatively smooth election in February—not violent by historical standards—stability in Uganda appeared a little shaky during the period of January-April 2011. Although there were reports of some irregularities and the use of state funds to shore up the incumbency, overall the election itself was considered reasonably free, if less than fair. Opposition candidates refused to concede defeat. Then, after a failed attempt to inspire popular protest against the election results, the opposition successfully mobilized a massive campaign of protests in multiple cities against rising food and fuel prices. This was seen as a demonstration of popular discontent with the effectiveness of government. These protests went on for days and frequently became violent. Several people were shot dead and hundreds were reportedly arrested during these protests.

Publication CR-11-18-UL
Published June 22, 2011
By Nate Haken, Annie Janus

Nigeria’s national and state elections, held in April of this year were rightly praised as the freest and fairest of Nigeria’s history. But that success was not necessarily tangible to everyone on the ground. As reported by local civil society organizations in the UNLocK early warning network, there were significant problems before, during, and after the elections, including ballot box snatching, vote buying, and a lot of political violence. These ongoing problems need to be recognized and addressed for this successful election to be consolidated as a turning point for democracy in Nigeria.

Published June 20, 2011
Publication CR-11-14-FS
Report available in PDF and Flash formats

The Failed States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Failed States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

June 20, 2011
By Nate Haken
The Failed States Index

After having contracted by 0.5% in 2009, global GDP is now very much in recovery mode, with growth of around 5% in 2010. However, this does not mean smooth sailing either for developing or developed countries. In the last year there have been massive protests against governments’ economic stewardship in countries as disparate as Greece and Burkina Faso, illustrating the sobering truth that under certain conditions recovery can be even more destabilizing than recession.

In 2009, economies in the developed world took a nosedive, as debt crises spread like wildfire, hopping through the Eurozone from Iceland, to Ireland, to Greece, and Portugal. Looking ahead, people are now turning their concern toward Spain. All of these countries, whether or not they have been, or will be, bailed out to stabilize their economies, are facing the necessity of austerity measures to prevent such crises from repeating themselves in the future. These austerity measures are being imposed as economies are now deemed strong enough to withstand them. Nevertheless, they have sparked protests, which have sometimes turned violent. Meanwhile, the recovering global economy is contributing to rising food and fuel prices, which have sparked massive protests and military crackdowns in Mozambique, Uganda, and Burkina Faso.

June 20, 2011
By Nate Haken
The Failed States Index

On December 17th, 2010, a fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi started a fire in Tunisia which quickly spread with riots and revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa. The “contagion” began in late 2010 with the fall of the Tunisian leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. So far, the turbulence has led to the ousting of two long-standing dictators, a war in one country and serious violence in at least three others. The Failed States Index did not predict this and nor does it try. The Failed States Index measures social, economic, and political and military pressures on states. Its data collection period extends from January to December of the previous year, especially notable in this instance since much of the tumult in the region did not manifest itself in violence and severe instability until after the sample period for the 2011 Index had closed.

May 3, 2011
By Kenneth C. Brill and Nate Haken
The Fund for Peace Commentary

Compared to past Nigerian elections, this one was relatively free and fair. Now the hard work begins for President Goodluck Jonathan. In the North, post election violence has killed over 100 people and displaced thousands. But the real worry, in many ways, is the situation in the South. Indeed, whether Nigeria slides inexorably towards state failure or joins the world’s emerging powers will be determined in the Niger Delta, the heart of the nation’s oil economy. Nigeria’s oil exports matter to Nigeria—they account for more than 80% of government revenue. Nigeria, as an oil producer matters to the world—it is the fourth largest exporter worldwide. The absence of sustainable development and security in the Niger Delta could impact the price of gas at the pump and the pace of the global economic recovery.

Publication CR-11-08-UL
Report available in PDF and Flash formats

The period of August—December 2010 was a very political season in Uganda, with the NRM (National Resistance Movement) primaries in August, the nomination of presidential candidates in October, followed by the beginning of the campaigns for the February 2011 elections. Thus, as could be expected, there was a sharp increase in reports coming from the UNLocK participants relating to political factors. Whereas in the previous five months there were relatively few reports relating to state legitimacy, this issue, particularly incidents of corruption and election irregularities, were reported frequently by participants from August to December. There were fears expressed about the potential for election violence, especially considering the 2009 and 2010 riots in Kampala, which some felt could be reignited in the heat of the contest. However, although there were a few reports of violence and intimidation, this was less of an issue in the run-up to the election than many had anticipated, especially as compared with previous Ugandan elections.

Publication CR-11-09-UL
Report available in PDF and Flash formats

During the period covered by this report (August-November 2010) the election season was getting under way. This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network, with a particular focus on the state and local levels in the Niger Delta region. According to these incident reports, candidates reportedly engaged in intimidation against their opponents. Candidates and their family member were kidnapped or killed. Criminal and vigilante elements were reportedly co-opted or recruited for political reasons. Officials were accused of corruption. The government’s rebel amnesty program continued to falter due in part to ambiguity and controversy over who is eligible to participate. Floods destroyed homes and poverty.

February 17, 2011
By Kenneth C. Brill and Nate Haken
The Fund for Peace Commentary

Elections are intended as a renewal of the social contract between the people and their government. But they can also violate that contract. In Africa, the 2011 election calendar is packed, adding to the hopes and fears of people across the content. So while the international spotlight is currently focused on the drama playing out in Egypt, a larger drama may be about to unfold elsewhere on the continent.

This is the year of the African election, with national-level elections scheduled in sixteen countries between January and December. Apart from Egypt, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Liberia, Djibouti, Benin, Niger, Madagascar, Chad, Cape Verde, Gambia, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Uganda all have national level elections this year. Some may be contested with force, not just ballots; others will be peaceful and possibly transformative. While democracy requires much more than a single election, good elections support democracy, development and security. Bad elections, including those whose results are overturned, can destabilize entire regions.

Published December 15, 2010 | By Dr. Pauline Baker, Nate Haken, Will Ferroggiaro

This report—Can Nigeria Achieve Unity in Diversity?—is the first in a series of papers examining how different countries manage ethnic, racial, religious, or other identities in order to prevent conflict leading to mass atrocities and genocide. The paper examines Nigeria’s political institutions, legal structures, and policy initiatives to address the issues arising from its complex society.

Several measures were adopted to encourage broad political inclusion and reduce the potential for conflict. First, Nigeria has created additional states from its original four regionally-based states in order to decentralize power to avoid secessionist movements and respond to demands for statehood from minorities. Second, a constitutional provision was established requiring “the federal character” to be reflected through state representation at the center through the “federal character” principle, which requires the national cabinet to include at least one minister from each of the 36 states. At the local level, the constitution provided for a preference for “indigenes” (by custom, this refers to those whose ancestors were original inhabitants of the community) over “non-indigenes” (those who migrated, or whose ancestors migrated, to the area). These designations affect the allocation of land, jobs, education, and political appointments. Third, an informal “power shifting” practice (sometimes referred to as the “zoning” or “rotational” rule) was adopted for the presidential nomination process of the dominant political party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It requires presidential nominees to rotate between Southerners and Northerners at least once every two terms (or eight years). Fourth, the electoral system was amended to discourage ethnic voting and secessionist tendencies. It requires, in addition to the popular vote, that a presidential candidate has to receive one-quarter of the votes cast in two-thirds of the states plus the federal capital to be declared a winner. On the surface, this provision appears to establish a government based on a broad mandate; in practice, it encourages political parties to pressure local agents to record winning votes in their areas at any cost. This requirement has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in elections, undermining political legitimacy, and generating public cynicism about elections generally. Finally, the positive effects that might have emerged from these efforts to foster political inclusion were undermined by a steady trend toward political centralization that emerged during approximately three decades of military rule.

In sum, the Nigerian experience shows the weakness of stressing form over function in managing diversity. Nigeria’s challenges in integrating ethnic, regional and religious identities into a framework based on national unity remain. Indeed, Nigeria could fragment again, and particular groups could again become targets of mass atrocities.

This paper and subsequent papers are produced by The Fund for Peace working with the cooperation of the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in order to assist the Special Adviser in his early warning and prevention efforts. The mandate of the Special Adviser is to make recommendations to the Secretary-General and through him, the United Nations Security Council, to prevent genocide, and to inform and educate opinion leaders and policy makers on how to recognize and prevent potential genocides. In support of the Office, the FfP is producing this series of objective case studies that identify the factors for identity conflict as well as government actions that either exacerbate or mitigate identity-related conflict. The primary goal of the papers is to identify best practices in how countries addressed identity and fostered inclusion so as to avoid such conflict.

The concept and modalities for the series of papers, as well as the countries to be examined, were jointly agreed between FfP and OSAPG. The papers employ the OSAPG Analysis Framework as a central lens on the issues. Drafts of the papers are peer reviewed by an independent expert reviewer chosen by FfP, a senior UN official, and OSAPG. The Fund for Peace finalizes the papers for dissemination within the UN system and to a broader public audience. This initiative has been generously supported by Humanity United, while the series of dialogues on the papers is supported by The Stanley Foundation.

The principal author of this paper is Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President Emeritus of The Fund for Peace. Senior Associates Will Ferroggiaro and Nate Haken contributed drafting, editing, and research, and FfP Intern Shane Hensinger assisted in production of the report. It was reviewed by John Campbell (U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria 2004-2007); a senior UN Department of Political Affairs official; and the Special Adviser and his staff. However, the views contained herein are solely those of The Fund for Peace.