Published November 8, 2012 | By Kendall Lawrence, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Nóra Loncsár

On April 26, 2012, the International Criminal Court convicted Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor for his role in the commission of crimes against humanity during the war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. For Sierra Leone, this brought a dark chapter to a close — and for Liberia as well.

From 1989 to 1990, Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson fought to overthrow then-president Samuel Doe. After Johnson captured and killed Doe (sipping a Budweiser as he chopped off his ears), he and Taylor fought a bloody war for control of Monrovia. Taylor eventually took power, but the country was plunged into a civil war that lasted until 2003 when peacekeepers were deployed and Taylor was exiled to Nigeria.

Researchers from The Fund for Peace (FFP) and Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW) were present in Gbarnga, Taylor’s erstwhile base of operations, for a conflict assessment workshop on the day of the conviction. Riot police and UNMIL forces were deployed en masse, standing by in the event of protest. However, time had apparently passed Taylor by. People went about their businesses. “It’s over,” one person said.

Published June 18, 2012 | By J. Messner, N. Haken, K. Hendry, P. Taft, K. Lawrence, T. Anderson, R. Jaeger, N. Manning, F. Umaña, A. Whitehead

The Failed States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Failed States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

Published June 18, 2012 | By Patricia Taft

The most improved country in the 2012 Failed States Index, the landlocked Central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan, seems an unlikely one. Since independence from Russia in 1991, the country has been beset with a host of problems that have spanned political, social and economic lines.

Like several of its Central Asian neighbors, the country plays host to various ethnic minorities, with Uzbeks the predominant group in the south of the country. Keeping in line with several other Central Asian Republics, Kyrgyzstan was ruled from independence by a series of authoritarian regimes which brutally quelled opposition and strangled freedom of expression in all its forms. Adding to the tinderbox are myriad demographic pressures resulting from disputes over natural resources, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, as well as the country’s complex relationship with Russia and, at times, the U.S.

When looking at Kyrgyzstan’s improvement in this year’s Index, it is impossible not to point out that last year, the country came second only to earthquake-ravaged Haiti in the category of states that had most worsened. Roiled by political turmoil that led to the ouster of long-time President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April of 2010, the year quickly turned bloody when clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks resulted in over 200 deaths in June. Clashes in the south of the country in 2010 also caused a large scale humanitarian emergency and IDP crisis, with hundreds of thousands of people, mostly ethnic Uzbeks, fleeing their homes. The attacks against ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan further heightened tensions with neighboring Uzbekistan, already at a boiling point over Tashkent’s decision to shut down natural gas supplies to the country by 50%. Spillover from the June uprising, coupled with a generally worsening economy also caused upheaval in the Ferghana Valley, leading to riots and protests where dozens were injured.

Published June 18, 2012 | By Patricia Taft

Continuing its downward spiral in the 2012 Failed States Index, Greece, the cradle of democracy, continued to fall into chaos. For a second year running, the country worsened across almost every indicator score with the political and economic indicators experiencing the deepest decline. In 2011, the Greek economy continued to backslide as the unemployment rate hovered around 20% for the year, with an estimated 50% of young Greeks unemployed. As in 2010, political crises ensued, and the perceived legitimacy of the Greek government plunged as more and more Greek citizens questioned the ability of elected officials to drag their country out of the morass. Indeed, throughout 2011, the general worsening of the indicators which measure economic, political and social pressures evidenced that the financial crisis that had gripped the country for two years was quickly spreading across multiple sectors. Public rage was palpable with tens of thousands of Greeks taking to the streets in June to protest proposed austerity measures that included significant tax hikes.

Adding to the mayhem and impacting the economic and political trends, the catastrophe that was occurring in Greece brought into question the viability of such lofty ideals as pan-European prosperity and social and economic equality as the country dragged down its European Union brethren. Greece, which joined the Eurozone in 2001 after failing to meet the criteria in 1999, has long been the red-headed stepchild of the monetary union. By mid-2011, after only ten years of membership, it had racked up a debt load on par with 150% of its GDP, unheard of elsewhere in the union. Meanwhile, other E.U. countries were beginning to show similar strains. Ireland, Italy and Portugal continued to worsen in 2011, with the economic and political indicators taking the hardest hits. Spain, although holding steady throughout most of the year, began to show signs of steady decline by the end of the year.

Published June 11, 2012 | By K. Lawrence, N. Haken, P. Taft, T. Anderson, S. Levine

The year 2011 was an illuminating period with respect to pressures and resilience in Liberia. Early in the year, Liberia experienced significant social pressures from abroad as neighboring Cote d’Ivoire descended into a major political crisis sending thousands of refugees into Nimba and Grand Gedeh counties. Then, internally, Liberia experienced heightened political pressure as the election season peaked in November. Despite this dangerous confluence of conflict drivers and triggers, there were no major outbreaks of violence during the year. Liberia was able to weather external shocks and internal pressure, reinforcing the notion that the country has come a long way since 2004. This report takes a look at Nimba and Montserrado counties within the broader national context, in terms of pressures and resilience throughout 2011 and beyond. It draws on data generated by local civil society networks, from automated content analysis data (from a sample of 28,634 news articles), and a qualitative review of the data, informed by field visits and desktop research.

Published March 19, 2012 | By Patricia Taft and Nate Haken

Since the Kony 2012 video about atrocities in Uganda went viral, there has been a backlash and counter-backlash over the campaign by Invisible Children to stop Joseph Kony and his rebels. Lost in the debate: the need to include the voices of Ugandans.

No doubt: The crimes of Joseph Kony are monstrous. And now, thanks to Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 campaign, millions more know about how he and his rag-tag forces destroyed communities and lives throughout northern Uganda and large swaths of East and Central Africa. The forcible conscription of children, the amputations, the sexual violence, and the pillaging of villages are Mr. Kony’s calling card. The predation began over 20 years ago. It continues to this day – though no longer in northern Uganda. It must be stopped.

Since the Kony 2012 internet video went viral, there has been a backlash and counter-backlash.

The backlash criticized Invisible Children for oversimplifying the issue. Certainly for those of us who have lived in Uganda and who have spent years working on these issues, it is difficult not to cringe at the missing nuance and the fast-and-loose treatment of history.

Published October 26, 2011 | By Patricia Taft and Nate Haken

Obama’s deployment of 100 American military advisers to Uganda could help defeat Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army. But things could also go horribly wrong. That's what happened before. Still, the factors that led to past failure can be clearly identified – and hopefully avoided.

If President Obama’s deployment of 100 American military advisers to Uganda helps defeat Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in the ungoverned spaces of central Africa, it will be the fall of yet another 20th-century monster on Mr. Obama’s watch. But as similar initiatives have done for over 20 years, it could also go horribly wrong.

That’s what happened the last time the United States got involved in a campaign to get rid of Mr. Kony and the LRA – the failed 2008 “Operation Lightning Thunder.” But the fate of this next attempt isn’t sealed. The factors that led to the failure of Operation Lightening Thunder can be clearly identified, and should be carefully considered, particularly in regard to civilian protection.

Published May 1, 2009 | By Patricia Taft, David Poplack and Rita Grossman-Vermaas

The FfP found that existing regional criminal networks in the Tri-Border Area have the potential to facilitate acts of WMD terrorism through: formal and informal financial networks, communications infrastructure, the provision of safe havens and identity “laundering,” and tested routes for the smuggling of personnel and materials throughout the hemisphere. Therefore, the Tri-Border Area may offer a rich enabling environment that could support a WMD terrorism scenario anywhere in the world—one characterized by corruption; gaps in the capacities of state intelligence, border security, and immigration control services; large legitimate economies and trading networks; sophisticated nuclear technology and expertise; and the presence of transnational criminal networks that overlap with the membership and activities of radical movements and terrorist elements.