Fall 2010
By Dr. James J.F. Forest
Journal of Threat Convergence, Vol. 1, No. 1

This article examines the socio-political dynamics of local governance within weak states, with particular focus on places that are governed by non-state entities. State weakness is a prime concern for threat convergence, and so-called “ungoverned territories” are central to this concern. However, in many cases this term is mis-applied to describe areas where there is in fact a form of governance, places where security and stability are maintained through a deeply-rooted hierarchy of loyalties and traditions. Several research and policy implications are drawn from this perspective. First, we must recognize the potentially counterproductive state-centric bias inherent in labeling certain places “ungoverned spaces”; rather, we should acknowledge that there are local non-state governance structures that in many cases are functioning effectively and are perceived by local inhabitants as having more legitimacy than the central government. In essence, there are places in the world which could be termed, “zones of competing governance,” in which an intense competition for loyalty takes place between local entities and the central government. We must strive to gain a better understanding of these places and the local non-state governance structures within them through research that transcends a variety of academic disciplines. Improved knowledge about the dynamics of zones of competing governance will then allow us to work toward converting them into zones of complementary or cooperative governance, where the mutual interests of local governance structures and the central government (including security, stability and a sustainable economy) can be achieved.

Why State Weakness Matters

Conventional discourse on threat convergence[i] has often focused on how weak states provide opportunities for transnational terrorist and criminal networks to find safe haven and facilitate the kinds of trafficking and black market transactions that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[ii] Weak states—described by Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick as lacking “the capacity and/or will to perform core functions of statehood effectively”[iii]—also play a prominent role in our nation’s strategies and policies to counter the threat of terrorism. As Liana Wyler recently noted, “the past three U.S. National Security Strategy documents all point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis or collapse.”[iv]

For many scholars and policymakers, the most troubling dimension of weak states is the lack of institutional capacity. Often, these weak states are described as having an “ungoverned space” or “lawless area” within their borders. In an extreme case like Somalia, the complete absence of a viable central government suggests that an entire state is “ungoverned.” The National Intelligence Council has described “failed or failing states” as having “expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control.”[v] Similarly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in its 2007 report Forces that Will Shape America’s Future, defines “failed or failing states” as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory.”[vi] A recent report by the American Security Project describes how “the challenge of ungoverned spaces remains a core issue in the management of the threat posed by transnational terrorism. A lack of government capacity allows terrorist groups to find sanctuary.”[vii]

The consensus appears to be that dire threats to U.S. national security may originate in places where a central state authority has seriously declined or is absent, or because such an authority is unable or unwilling to govern that territory. Policy recommendations that address ungoverned spaces generally emphasize strengthening the capabilities of a central government to extend its writ to those areas. As a result, a flow of equipment, training and funding is often directed to weak states in order to shore up their military, police, and border security capabilities—the idea being that increased kinetic force projection capabilities (and, to a minor degree, increased provision of services) within the state will lead directly to reduced security threats from its ungoverned spaces.

For the purposes of understanding and countering threat convergence, we must focus on a type of “ungoverned space” that is actually not ungoverned at all. Rather, this is sometimes called a “zone of competing governance” or a “region with parallel governance structures.” In essence, it is a place governed by entities other than the forces of an established nation-state. In these zones, a diverse array of forces are seen by locals as having the moral legitimacy or capacity to settle disputes, impose order and provide social services. Their authority may stem from traditional governance structures, and can include ethnic or village leaders, elders, warlords, clan patriarchs, monarchs, emirs, chiefs, religious leaders, or sometimes even criminal or mafia dons. State weakness matters. But in many cases, it is equally as important to understand the manner in which various parts of the state or region may be governed by local, rather than central, entities.[viii]

Zones of Competing Governance

In the literature on state weakness, there are myriad examples that illustrate how zones of competing governance are markedly different from truly “ungoverned” spaces. In a zone of competing governance, the limited (or lack of) central government presence creates an enabling opportunity for other forms of governance to succeed. In some cases, the central government may even be strong but the inhabitants of a particular region reject the state’s claim of legitimate authority, and direct their loyalties instead toward informal power structures represented in familiar identity groups, such as ethnic groups, clans, religious sects or tribal systems.[ix]

Within these zones of competing governance, those who have power often play by a different set of rules than the formal governments of nation-states. Trust is established not by a legal system or formal contract between a leader and those governed, but by informal systems of traditional customs and moral codes. Here we may find a functioning security and intelligence apparatus, some forms of commerce and transportation, even a local customs-based or religious mediation system, such as tribal councils or Sharia courts, for resolving disputes—none of which are necessarily controlled or perhaps even sanctioned by the nation-state. Unlike the image that comes to mind when using the term “ungoverned spaces,” there is actually some sense of order here, although the nation-state is not considered the primary or effective authority that maintains that order.

The implications of the dynamics in zones of competing governance for threat convergence are clear. Terrorist and criminal networks invariably require some form of safe haven in which to carry out their illicit activities (like providing terrorist training or smuggling weapons). In some cases, these groups may establish a stronghold in a place of relative isolation, far from the prying eyes of a state’s security services. However, as Angel Rabasa notes, “if the territory is so undeveloped that terrorists cannot communicate, move funds, or travel from remote locations to urban areas, it will be difficult for them to organize and execute attacks. . . . As a result, completely ungoverned territories lacking even those basic assets would hold little appeal for a terrorist group that, like any organized entity, requires at least a semblance of structure to operate.[x]

More often, criminal and terrorist networks thrive under the protection of local power structures, involving both state and non-state actors, in places where they can move and operate invisibly. In fact, invisibility within a secure territory that has a functioning infrastructure may be the most important kind of safe haven a clandestine network can have. Rather than a chaotic, unstable “ungoverned space,” these groups are much more likely to prefer places where someone other than the state is providing security and other basic services, and where their activities can be conducted with relative openness and impunity. In essence, it is possible for zones of competing governance to be attractive environments for criminal or terrorist groups, providing order and infrastructure that are absent in truly ungoverned territories. Thus, effective capacity-building, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies must look for ways to ensure that the governing powers within these zones constrain or prevent criminal or terrorist group activity.

There are generally two kinds of zones—rural and urban—in which these non-state forms of governance take place. The kind of geographic terrain that characterizes a rural zone may be of particular interest to terrorists and criminals if it offers a bounded territory that can be defended by locals from outsiders or government forces. From dense jungles to arid deserts, the physical isolation afforded by these places allows maximum freedom and flexibility for organized non-state actors and makes it difficult for state security authorities to patrol. Among the more prominent examples of rural zones of competing governance are:

• Most of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where people identify more with clans or ethnic groups than with the state. This is especially true in several eastern provinces where civil war remnant factions and armed groups from neighboring countries control territories and considerable resources;[xi]
• On the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, where Muslim inhabitants commonly known as Moros or Bangamoro (the Moro nation) have contested the authority of the Manila government and its religious and cultural influence since the Spanish colonial period.[xii]
• Dense jungle areas of eastern Peru, particularly the Huallaga Valley, where Sendero Luminoso at one point had established a network of revolutionary governments and training camps, and has recently seen a resurgence;
• Southern and northern regions of Colombia controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), or in some cases by paramilitary groups like the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC);
• Several regions of Yemen, often described by scholars and the media as “lawless” and desperately poor, although locally-based informal governance systems are common;
• Southern Sudan, a place roughly the size of Texas but with only 30 miles of paved roads, few health facilities, and several armed non-state actors competing against each other (and against the Sudanese government) for influence and territorial control; and
• Northern Nigeria, where sharia[xiii] law has been adopted and the official government struggles for legitimacy against the emergence of radical Islamist sects.

Many zones of competing governance transcend the border regions of multiple states, creating unique enabling environments for criminal and terrorist networks. As a recent report by Centre for Strategic Studies in The Hague noted, terrorists “seek out the soft spots, the weak seams of the Westphalian nation-state and the international order that it has created . . . terrorist organizations operate on the fringes of this Westphalian system, in the grey areas of territoriality.”[xiv] Example could include:

• The tri-border area of South America (where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil meet), whose overcrowded cities are hubs of arms and drug smuggling, extortion, counterfeiting and other illicit network activities;
• The vast Sahel region in Africa, south of the Sahara Desert, where ethnic groups like the Taureg and Berabiche have cooperated with elements of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to generate revenue.[xv]
• The border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly areas of southeast Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan, populated by a diverse mix of Pashtun tribes and warlords whose militias are often targeted by (or sometimes allied with) various elements of Taliban, influential leaders of the al-Qaida network, and Kashmiri separatist groups[xvi];
• Kurdish regions of southern Turkey and northern Iraq, including (but not exclusively) where elements of the PKK/Kongra-Gel have influence[xvii]; and
• The Iraq-Syria border, where tribes and communities living on both sides of the border have facilitated a vibrant weapons smuggling route through Iraq’s Ninawa province.[xviii]

In contrast to these geographically large rural areas, urban zones of competing governance may exist within parts of a city—like Karachi, where Taliban militants from the tribal areas come to take refuge among the hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani refugees in the kacha abadi (slums) such as Quid Abad, Sohrab Goth and Kiamaree.[xix] Hybrid zones of competing governance (both rural and urban) also exist, encompassing several cities in a particular region, like southern Lebanon—the primary control and power base for Hizballah, the shiite[xx] militia, political party, and designated foreign terrorist organization by several countries.[xxi] Other examples of hybrids include parts of the Black Sea Region, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.[xxii]

Not all zones of competing governance exist within weak states or aspiring independent nations; witness the powerful mafia presence in places like Italy, Russia and Ukraine—where it is widely acknowledged that the most powerful (and widely feared) forces in certain places are not of the government—or some particularly troublesome banlieues of Paris, where the police often fear to tread. Other examples include the Basque region of northern Spain and southern France, the Caucasus region of Russia and Georgia, the island of Mindanao of the Philippines, and the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iraq and Syria.[xxiii] These are all places where local inhabitants—perhaps feeling marginalized or excluded by the dominant sectors of society—have developed considerable animosity or disaffection towards the central government, generating opportunities for non-state actors to gain influence by providing vital services where needed.

Implications for Research and Policy

The importance of this discussion is reflected in the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policy debates between “centralists” (those who advocate building up a powerful central government, capable of providing services to all its citizens) and “localists” (those who argue instead that security and stability can only be achieved by strengthening local institutions and non-state entities).[xxiv] A centralist tends to favor using the term “ungoverned spaces” in their policy debates and recommendations, indicating a potentially counterproductive state-centric bias. On the other hand, a localist may adopt the more nuanced term “zones of competing governance” in his/her analysis, but must be careful that his/her policy suggestions do not undermine a central government’s perceived legitimacy or sovereign authority. Implications that flow from this discussion can be organized around two general statements: 1) new, policy-relevant research is needed in order to improve our understanding of “zones of competing governance” and the local non-state governance structures within them; and 2) our policies should strive to influence an evolution in these places toward becoming zones of complementary or cooperative governance where the mutual interests of local governance structures and the central government (including security, stability and a sustainable economy) can be achieved.

Research Implications

There is a need for in-depth studies on zones of competing governance, and a reconsideration of the terminology used in policy analysis. The nature and characteristics of these zones vary, and within each we need to understand the local hierarchy of loyalties, existing structures of influence and governance, and the complex landscape of grievances between tribes and the nation-state. Questions to study include who has power, and why; what are the informal networks of power distribution, and are they based on tribal/clan/ethnic affiliation; and how these informal governing systems negotiate their relationship (if any) with the nation-state. As David Kilcullen recently observed, the most useful information to gather for the policymaker and practitioner includes “local knowledge, cultural understanding, and local contacts.”[xxv]

Research on local entities, including tribal militias, warlords, armed groups, and criminal organizations, should provide ways to differentiate between those that foster instability and those that actually maintain stability, security and provide good governance within their spheres of influence. In some cases, local governing systems may be predatory in nature, alienating the local populace through corruption, human rights abuses, and arbitrary use of violent force. Here, there are clear opportunities for a central government to demonstrate an alternative with greater fairness and legitimacy. But in many other cases, the governing entities protect their own ethnic or tribal group members and are perceived by local inhabitants as being preferred over the central government.

Clarity and data on the ways in which these zones are governed can contribute to our understanding of the potential for transnational criminal and terrorist network activity. A key research question is under what conditions would tribal leaders see it in their tribe’s best interests to facilitate (or prevent) the activities of criminal networks, terrorists, and especially WMD proliferators. To paraphrase Stewart Patrick’s recent observation, the challenge for researchers and policy analysts is to discern more carefully which zones of competing governance are likely to present which baskets of transnational problems.[xxvi]

Studies on the dynamics of these zones should pay particular attention to the economic dimensions of the struggle between government and non-government entities for influence and power over a local population. For example, central governments tend to respond unfavorably toward illicit economies even when they are a central or primary means of commerce and livelihood for local populations. In contrast, an insurgent or terrorist groups’ involvement in, or protection of, illicit economies can help it acquire and wield political capital that can lead to local support and greater operational capabilities. As an extension, central government efforts to eradicate a local illicit economy could actually strengthen the relationship between locals and terrorists or other armed groups, rather than diminish their power and influence.

In addition to greater clarity on the political and economic dynamics of these zones, the terminology used in our research and analysis (as well as the policies they support) must reflect a greater sensitivity to the perceptions of zone inhabitants. To populations who reside within such zones, the nuances of the different terms used matter—the issue of “who governs” is of most importance to the local populations being governed. If the outside observer’s standard approach is to favor a central government, it may automatically set one up to be at odds with local values, beliefs, and willingness to be governed by that authority. Thus, referring to places as “ungoverned spaces,” implying the absence of governance, is not only misleading conceptually, it also suggests an inherent bias toward the central government’s legitimacy to govern, regardless of the specific nature of that regime.

For instance, identifying places within Yemen, Pakistan or Nigeria as “ungoverned” implies that even though there are tremendous questions of government legitimacy in these countries, our view is that only the presence of the central government would transform such places into being “governed.” This type of Westphalian state-centric arrogance can certainly alienate the kind of local governing entities whose help we need most in our efforts to counter threat convergence. Thus, before generating policies that offer a more sophisticated approach to the challenges identified in this essay, we must first ensure that the terms and language we use in our analysis reflect an appropriate balance of respect toward a state’s central governments and the local governance structures within these zones.

Policy Implications

The basic policy goal being discussed is to constrain or prevent criminal and terrorist network activity in these zones of competing governance. In some cases, the research on a particular region may indicate that strengthening a central government’s military and police forces—expanding its ability to project kinetic force into those zones—will be the most effective means of achieving this objective. In other cases, the research may indicate a need to work with and through local governing entities, using a policy framework which seeks to transform these places into zones of complementary or cooperative governance, where the mutual interests of locals and the central government (including security, stability and a sustainable economy) can be recognized and achieved.

A third option integrates both the centralist and localist perspectives. As Seth Jones recently argued in Foreign Affairs about U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, “creating a strong centralized state may help ensure long-term stability . . . [but] the current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency efforts must take place alongside bottom-up programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to enlist them in providing security and services at the village and district levels.”[xxvii] Our response to these zones of competing governance and the potential role they could play in threat convergence scenarios must incorporate both state-centric and non-state elements.

It is widely acknowledged that efforts to strengthen weak states encompass more than equipping the military and police forces to better impose their will on a probably suspicious or even inhospitable population in a zone of competing governance. A government must be seen as effective in meeting the critical service needs, including agricultural support, energy, transportation, legal, health and communications infrastructure, of a zone’s inhabitants. As mentioned above, local non-state power structures in these zones may garner more loyalty and affection than the state by providing physical security (as do the Arbakai militia groups in the Pashtun tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan); providing economic assistance for the poor and elderly (as Hizballah does); building parks, sponsoring sports teams and providing school supplies to children (as do a number of Brazilian gangs);[xxviii] selling discount goods to members of the community (a common activity in the Tri-border Area of South America); and helping locals after natural disasters or conflicts. The overall challenge for governments, then, is to provide a level of services and legitimacy that makes other service providers redundant and unnecessary, and strengthens the level of trust between the state and those it seeks to govern.

It is also important to address the myriad factors that de-legitimize a government (including corruption, malfeasance, preferential treatment, nepotism, and oppression), as well as working to change local perceptions of these things. Among the oft-heralded benefits of democracy, perhaps the most important element to highlight here is accountability—that is, a government must be seen to be more accountable to the governed than those non-state elements with whom they are competing for hearts and minds. For example, in the abovementioned Arbakai system,[xxix] there are two mechanisms for accountability—the Jirga and the tribal population at large, among whom the Jirga’s decisions are made known and are empowered by tribal custom to confront Arbakai members who do not uphold those decisions. These forms of accountability help reinforce legitimacy in this form of governance. In comparison, widespread corruption and bribery involving Afghan police and government officials generates a stronger affinity among Pashtuns toward tribal governance structures, for whom honor and integrity are such vital parts of life. Thus, strengthening Afghanistan’s military and police forces must be coupled with a concerted effort to tackle endemic corruption within the security forces. Overall, establishing legitimacy, transparency, meritocracy in both the public and private sector, and the rule of equitable and fair laws enforced by an independent judiciary, should be seen as important as creating stronger and more professional security and police forces

Of course, there are situations where strengthening the state may not produce any real improvements in security within zones of competing governance, and in fact could lead to increased conflict and alienation. “Strengthening” a state that is viewed by locals as illegitimate (or perhaps even corrupt and apostate) could exacerbate their preference for alternative governance systems. In such instances, efforts to tackle the factors that de-legitimize a government must be combined with an understanding of how to make it in the local authority’s best interests to cooperate with, or even assume a secondary role to, the nation-state. Surely, as described above, studying the factors that produce and sustain zones of competing governance can yield insights on how a government’s soft power can be directed toward improving the relationship between the nation-state and society in these areas.

If we rely solely on state-level entities to address critical sub-national security challenges—especially those related to potential safe havens within zones of competing governance—we may be overlooking a critical resource in the struggle against threat convergence. Non-state actors can provide an important intelligence and policing function, the effectiveness of which is both in their own and the state’s best interests. While informal governing powers in these zones may be less concerned about ‘country’ or ‘nation’ than protecting family, tribes, customs, we must remember that these are at risk from threat convergence the same as a nation-state government.

Engaging tribes or other informal governance systems requires expanding our policies and funding beyond a purely state-centric approach, while working to improve (and not undermine) an already fragile perception of state legitimacy in many regions. Perhaps there are opportunities for the U.S. to provide assistance as an ‘honest broker’ for productive interaction between a state and powerful non-state actors in these zones, toward a mutually beneficial objective of countering terrorist and criminal network activity and especially WMD proliferation. Ultimately, a state-centric approach to confronting threat convergence is unlikely to supplant the many kinds of informal authority that provide governance in these parts of the world.[xxx]

Finally, transforming zones of competing governance into zones of complementary or cooperative governance requires working with both the central government and local leaders to help them recognize where their interests are aligned and how to achieve shared objectives. There are some things that most often can only be provided through the resources of a national government, like a reliable nationwide power grid or telecommunications system, paved roads, water treatment systems, and national defense against other countries. Meanwhile, in most weak states the local level is where we see the greatest examples of economic entrepreneurship, as well as the most effective and culturally-relevant conflict resolution systems. Confronting the challenges of threat convergence in these zones requires policies and strategies that integrate state-centric and local, non-state perspectives in ways that are respectful, relevant, and flexible.

Endnotes:

[1] James JF Forest, PhD is a Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He has published over 12 books and dozens of articles on terrorism, counterterrorism and organizational learning. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of Defense or any other organization of the U.S. government.

[i] For this article, the working definition of threat convergence—the “potential confluence of WMD proliferation, terrorism, and weak and failing states”—is provided by the Center for the Study of Threat Convergence at The Fund for Peace. Please see: http://www.fundforpeace.org/tc.

[ii] For example, see Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, August 28, 2008 (p. 6); and Condoleeza Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security,” Washington Post (December 11, 2005) in which she describes how weak and failing states serve as “global pathways” that facilitate the “movement of criminals and terrorists” and “proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

[iii] Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” Brookings Institution (2008) p. 5

[iv] Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States” (p. 1), referring to the National Security Strategy of the United States (White House, 1998, 2003, 2006).

[v] National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project (2004), available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf Cited in Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States” (p. 25)

[vi] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Forces that Will Shape America’s Future: Themes from GAO’s Strategic Plan, 2007-2012” (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items.d0746sp.pdf.

[vii] American Security Project, “Are We Winning? Measuring the Progress in the Struggle Against al Qaeda and Associated Movements,” 2009 report (Washington, DC: American Security Project), p. 14. Also, please see Patricia Taft and David Poplack, “The Sum of its Conflicted Parts: Threat Convergence Risks in the Black Sea Region. Fund for Peace (January 2008), particularly the discussion on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

[viii] For more on this, see Angel Rabasa, “Ungoverned Territories,” Testimony presented (February 14, 2008) before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation), p. 6

[ix] Ibid, p. 4

[x] Ibid, p. 6

[xi] Specific examples in the DRC abound, from the Banyamulenge community on the High Plateau of South Kivu to the Burundian Hutu insurgency movement FDD, the Mai Mai, Interhamwe, and Rwandan RCG/Goma forces.

[xii] Angel Rabasa, “Ungoverned Territories,” p. 4

[xiii] Sharia is an Arabic word meaning ‘way’ or ‘path’, and sharia law (or Islamic law) is a legal code that articulates for Muslims the path of the righteous, based on scholarly interpretations of the sacred texts (including the Koran) and traditions of Islam.

[xiv] Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness,” Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, November 2005, p. 22. In order to help refine the discussion on terrorist sanctuaries, the authors propose looking at “Black Holes” that can be transnational in nature, rather than focusing on failed states. Their report identifies 41 “black holes” in the non-Western world. Most involve at least two countries, often more.

[xv] Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 17, 2009 (p. 4)

[xvi] There is limited knowledge of how many Pashtun tribes populate the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but there is ample literature on the traditional lifestyle and rules of conduct of these tribes. Law and order in these tribal areas has traditionally been maintained by Arbakai, militias that operate in a limited geographic area and carry out at least three common functions: 1) enforce the decisions of the Jirga, an assembly of tribal leaders, 2) maintain law and order, and 3) protect and defend borders and boundaries of the tribe of community. For more on Pashtun tribes, please see “My Cousin’s Enemy is my Friend: A Study of Pashtun ‘tribes’ in Afghanistan,” published by TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, US Army, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, September 2009. Available online at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=32789; Mohammed Osman Tariq, “Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeastern Afghanistan,” Crisis States Research Centre, London, UK (December 2008).

[xvii] Along the Turkey-Iraq border, local representatives of Kurdish socio-political networks collect so-called transfer taxes or customs fees from truckers, weapons smugglers and drug traffickers. Leaders of these Kurdish networks benefit from the tax payments and employ standard patronage systems to assure loyalty. Networked men get jobs, and their loyalty to this system helps to sustain their families while ensuring the continued socio-political power of these Kurdish leaders. Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds (Forthcoming, 2010).

[xviii] Andrea Plebani, “Ninawa Province: Al-Qaida’s Remaining Stronghold,” CTC Sentinel Vol. 3, No. 1 (Combating Terrorism Center, January 2010), p. 20

[xix] Imtiaz Ali, “Karachi Becoming a Taliban Safe Haven?” CTC Sentinel Vol. 3, No. 1 (Combating Terrorism Center, January 2010), p. 15. Also, for a brief account of Karachi as an “ungoverned urban space,” see American Security Project “Are We Winning?” p. 15.

[xx] Shia Islam differs from Sunni, Sufi and other denominations of Islam primarily in the belief that only the true descendents of the prophet Muhammad – known as Imams – should rule Muslim communities. The followers of Shia Islam are called Shias or Shiites.

[xxi] In southern Lebanon, the shiite militia Hezbollah has tremendous influence in the areas of commerce,

housing, politics, education, religion, and social activities—indeed, nothing meaningful can be accomplished here without Hezbollah’s awareness (and tacit approval). For some time, Hezbollah members have not only been ‘above the law’ they have ‘been the law’. With an annual budget estimated at over $250 million, the group runs a network of schools, charities and clinics, along with its own satellite television and radio stations. In essence, southern Lebanese know and recognize the power held and exercised by Hezbollah; for some, this power is viewed as legitimate, and for others it is not (although recent statements by the organization’s leader Hassan Nasrallah indicate an interest in improving perceptions of its legitimacy.)

[xxii] Patricia Taft and David Poplack, “The Sum of its Conflicted Parts: Threat Convergence Risks in the Black Sea Region,” (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, January 2008), p. 8-10

[xxiii] cf. Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2010)

[xxiv] For a recent example of this debate, see Seth G. Jones, “It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010

[xxv] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 242.

[xxvi] Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, 27-53 (p. 33)

[xxvii] Seth G. Jones, “It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010). Online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66350/seth-g-jones/it-takes-the-v...

[xxviii] For more on Brazilian gangs, please see Enrique Desmond Arias (2006). Drugs and Democracy in Rio de

Janeiro. Chapel Hill, N.C.:UNC Press; and Luke Dowdney, "Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Children in Organized Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro. A report of the Children and Youth in Organized Crime International Study (COAV). (2005). Available online at: http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/livroluke_eng.pdf.

[xxix] See note 16.

[xxx] For more on this, see Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford University Press, 2010.