Published December 10, 2012 | By Nate Haken, Filipa Carreira, Elizaveta Egorova, Rachel Hersh

Not every explosion in northern Nigeria stems from the radicalism of Boko Haram. Nor is every outbreak of violence in the Niger Delta the result of militants fighting over oil revenues. Rather, violence in its different forms is an expression of a broader and deeper fabric of social, economic, political, and security challenges. Given the wrong set of underlying conditions, collective violence can spark seemingly out of nowhere, whether or not there is a formal paramilitary group active in the region. Even when such organizations do not exist, in an area with past and current episodes of insecurity, latent structures may still be there, to be crystallized at a moments notice--in the event of a political contest, land dispute, turf warfare, or chieftaincy tussle.  Violence can sometimes be self-organizing.  Just add water.

The government’s amnesty program in the Niger Delta has been partially successful. Attacks by militants on oil facilities and state assets have been much reduced. However, since 2009, organized insurgency in the Niger Delta has morphed into a situation of general lawlessness — abductions, murders, gang violence, intra-communal violence, land disputes, mob justice, and political thuggery. Meanwhile, in the North, ethnic and sectarian violence has polarized communities causing some to migrate into religious enclaves out of fear. During the period of May-October 2012, there were bombings in Kaduna and large scale communal violence in Plateau. In addition to the shifting patterns of violence in the North and the South, there were also devastating floods — Nigeria’s worst in 40 years — which further exacerbated pressure on the state’s ability to manage conflict risk.

Published June 27, 2012 | By Nate Haken, Natalie Manning, Megan Turner, Amelia Whitehead

As Goodluck Jonathan begins his new term as President of Nigeria, he faces many challenges. Even as a fragile peace takes hold in the Niger Delta, gang violence and criminality continue unabated. In the North, Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group, continues to wreak havoc. Though the government has taken some steps towards strengthening the democratic process, instances of corruption and vote rigging have been reported at the state and local levels over the past seven months. The Nigerian government, civil society, and other stakeholders must take steps to address these governance and security issues, or risk further instability in the future.

This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society representatives in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network from October 2011 to April 2012, with a particular focus on the state and local government area levels of Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta and Kaduna.

Incidents and issues summarized here include election irregularities surrounding gubernatorial elections, such as political corruption and intimidation, as well as social and economic pressures relating to land competition, group grievance and violent crime. These incidents and issues are categorized according to the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) framework, which allows for a holistic evaluation of the pressures on society and the state that could increase the risk of instability.

Published October 28, 2011 | By Nate Haken, Tierney Anderson, Julie Andrus, Erin Crandell

Nigeria’s election in April 2011 represented a huge step forward with respect to democratization. However, there was significant resistance on the part of vested interests, which led to an escalation of many conflict risk factors at the local and national levels in the subsequent five months. Nigerian stakeholders in government, civil society, and private sectors must not rest on their laurels after this relatively successful election. Doing so would risk losing all that has been gained.

This report compiles the incidents and issues documented by civil society representatives in the UNLocK Nigeria early warning network from April -September 2011, with a particular focus on the state and local government area levels of Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Kaduna. There is a two month period of overlap between this report and the last, which covered December 2010-May 2011. The reason for this overlap is that UNLocK participants met in September for a workshop, adding considerably to the data compiled on events in April and May. Rather than archive that newly collected data, we wanted to include it in this report for a fuller picture of the landscape as perceived by the early warning network.

Published October 4, 2011
By Nate Haken, Tierney Anderson, Julie Andrus, Erin Crandell
Publication CUUGR1125
Report available in PDF and Flash formats

In February, Ugandans reelected President Museveni to a fifth term in office by a landslide. A few weeks after the election, massive protests over the government’s management of the economy broke out in cities across the country and sometimes turned violent. Since then, the protests have subsided, but food prices remain high and segments of the population still feel politically disenfranchised. This context poses a challenge to continued progress for democracy and human rights in Uganda.

This report is a summary of incidents and issues from May to August 2011, with a special focus on pastoral conflict in Karamoja and land conflict in Acholi, as reported by a network of local civil society representatives who have been using FFP’s Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) since 2008. The project engages local civil society for better conflict assessment, early warning, and prevention.