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Thank you Mr. Vincent for your kind introduction. And
thank you for inviting me to speak on the crisis in the Congo to the
World Affairs Council of Greater Fort Worth. The Congo is a
country I know well. About 25 years ago, I went to what was then
called Zaire as Associate Director for Education for the Peace
Corps. For three years, I was directly responsible for 100 to 150
volunteer teachers scattered pretty much all over the country. For
two to three weeks out of every five or six, I was on the road
visiting them at their sites and observing them teaching at their
schools.
The country is about the size of the United States east of
the Mississippi River. It has 54 million people, more than double
the number when I was working there. Each of its seven regions is
distinct with different languages and ethnic groups predominating.
It is a country rich in minerals. Chief among them are copper and
cobalt, but diamonds, gold, zinc, tin, and a new one called col-tan
- used in the high tech industry - are plentiful. Despite the
Congo’s wealth, its infrastructure is poor and deteriorating. Roads,
electricity, water availability are all in worse shape than they were
25 years ago. Today, the formal economy is practically non-existent.
Over the last decade, the Congo has registered negative
growth with 24,000 percent inflation in 1994. Mining is at 10
percent of earlier levels. Diamonds are going to the black market,
and, with other minerals, are fueling the current conflict.
It is that conflict we want to look at tonight. I will try to
answer the following questions: Why is there a war in the Congo?
Who is involved and why? What is the impact on the population?
Is there a solution? What has been the U.S. role? And, what is the
prognosis for the future? The conflict, sometimes referred to as
Africa’s world war, may be closer to resolution now than at any
time since it started more than two and a half years ago, in August
1998. Since Joseph Kabila took over the Presidency of the country
after his father was assassinated in January, he has been actively
pursuing peace. But the road ahead remains fraught with
obstacles. Just a couple weeks ago, a rebel group refused to allow
the UN peacekeeping troops to deploy in their territory, demanding
that the UN first condemn cease-fire violations by the government
side. But I am getting ahead of myself. Let’s go back to the
beginning.
Why is there a war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC)?
To answer this question we have to go back to 1994. At
that time Mobutu Sese Seko, who had seized power in a 1965
coup, was at the helm in the country then called Zaire. His
unpopular dictatorship, and personal greed, had run the country
into the ground. The people were struggling to survive from day to
day. Next door, in tiny Rwanda, genocide took place, in which up
to 800,000 minority Tutsi were slaughtered by the majority Hutu.
The killing ended only after the rebel Tutsi army captured the
capital, Kigali, and routed the killers. The killers, namely
members of the Hutu government army and the Interahamwe
militia, fled across the border into Zaire, taking more than one
million civilians with them. For the next nearly two years, the
killers, or genocidaires, lived in and dominated the refugee camps
in Zaire. During this time, they made clandestine raids back into
Rwanda, destabilizing the efforts of the minority Tutsi rulers to get
the country on its feet again.
In 1996, the Rwandan government took two steps to end
these raids. In September it sponsored an uprising of indigenous
Zairians, headed by Laurent-Desire Kabila, whose stated goal was
to overthrow Mobutu. This uprising swept across Zaire, with the
backing of Rwanda and neighboring Uganda, both of whom
wanted to create a buffer zone along their borders with Zaire to
deter rebels from easy access to their countries. In May 1997,
Mobutu fled the country and the rebels entered the capital,
Kinshasa, victorious. Kabila became president of the renamed
Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC. The second step the
Rwandans took, soon after the uprising began, was to send their
own troops into the refugee camps in December to separate the
civilians from the armed elements. The armed elements retreated
deeper into Zaire, while the civilians returned en masse to Rwanda.
Little more than a year later, Rwanda called on Kabila to
exercise greater control over the ex-army and Interahamwe militia,
threatening problems if he did not. Kabila had alienated not only
Rwanda but also other backers. He had invited close friends and
relatives into the government, banned all political parties other
than his own, and promised elections that never came. So, in
August of 1998, Rwanda again supported insurgency inside the
DRC, this time against its former ally Kabila. Instead of clamping
down on the ex-army and militia, Kabila began to arm them,
reasoning that they could help him fend off the new rebels and the
Rwandans. This rift between Kabila and his former Rwandan ally
marked the beginning of the current conflict. Rwanda’s concern
over its security from the genocidaires continues to be at the root
of this war and will necessarily play a role in whether or not it can
be brought to a successful end.
Who is Involved and Why?
What began as a rebellion in eastern Congo soon sucked in
six neighboring armies and several rebel movements.
Arrayed against the DRC government are Rwanda,
Uganda, and Burundi and two rebel movements, one backed by
Rwanda and one by Uganda. Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government is
fighting to establish a buffer zone in eastern Congo to protect
Rwanda from the Hutu militia and former army soldiers who
committed genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and who continue to
threaten destabilization of the country. Rwanda has an estimated
10,000 troops in the DRC, fighting mainly in the eastern Kivu and
the southern Katanga regions. Rwanda supports the rebel group
the Congolese Rally for Democracy or RCD, based in the eastern
Kivu town of Goma with an estimated 4,000 fighters.
Uganda entered the war to support its then ally Rwanda and
to fend off its own rebels based in the DRC. It also has about
10,000 troops fighting primarily in the north. It supports a
coalition of northern-based rebel groups known as the Congolese
Liberation Front or CLF, a 4,000-strong group which is led by
Jean-Pierre Bemba, a wealthy Congolese businessman.
Burundi’s Tutsi-dominated military has fought sporadically
in the DRC, primarily in pursuit of Burundi’s Hutu rebels who
have established bases in the DRC.
Arrayed behind the DRC government are Zimbabwe,
Angola, and Namibia. Kabila invited them into the war early on
when, in late August 1998, rebels threatened to capture Kinshasa
after crossing the country by air. The threat of war in the capital
was serious enough to cause the evacuation of diplomats (the U.S.
closed its embassy) and foreigners. Only the intervention of
Zimbabwe and Angola was able to turn the tide in favor of the
government. They have remained loyal backers ever since.
Zimbabwe has no security interests at stake in the DRC. Its
intervention may have been more related to President Robert
Mugabe’s interest in playing a greater role in the region. The war
has been costly for Zimbabwe. The Kabila government granted
Zimbabwe contracts and economic agreements in mining activities
to help sustain its interest, but the deals have not resulted in the
anticipated profit. To the contrary, Zimbabwe has had to spend an
estimated $300 million on the war, and forgo an agreement with
the IMF because of it. Zimbabwe has approximately 11,000 troops
pledged to the Congo war, which is highly unpopular with the
economically depressed people of Zimbabwe.
Angola joined up with the Kabila government in order to
assure DRC support against its own rebel group, UNITA, that has
been fighting the Angolan government since independence and
using supply routes through the DRC to do so. Angola has had
about 2,000 troops committed to the Congo war. They confine
themselves to guarding specific strategic points such as the port of
Matadi, the Kamina airbase, and the Inga-Shaba hydro-electricity
dam that feeds the Angola grid. In return for Angola’s assistance,
Kabila’s government granted Angola’s national fuel company
control of the DRC’s petroleum distribution and production
networks.
Namibia, like Zimbabwe, has no security interests at stake
in the DRC. It has nevertheless, committed some 2,000 troops to
the government’s cause. They are instrumental in defending the
strategic towns of Mbandaka, in the northwest, and Mbuji Mayi, a
diamond-mining center in the middle of the country. Namibia’s
minister of mines recently admitted that the country has
commercial interests in a diamond mine in the DRC.
Also fighting for the government side are about 15,000
Hutu militiamen from Rwanda and about 15,000 Hutu rebels from
Burundi. Most of their fighting is in eastern Congo close to their
home countries rather than on the front lines of the war.
While the pro-government forces have signed lucrative
contracts for minerals and petroleum with the DRC government,
the anti-government forces are simply taking the country’s riches
for themselves. Gold, diamonds and timber are plentiful in the
territory controlled by the Uganda-backed rebels, while diamonds,
tin and col-tan are easily available in the territory controlled by
Rwandan-backed rebels. Col-tan, for example, is being exported
by the RCD rebel group at $200,000 a ton on chartered air cargo
flights to Europe. It is a mineral vital to the manufacture of mobile
phones, jet engines, air bags, night vision goggles, fiber optics and
capacitators, the components that maintain an electric charge in a
computer chip.
Defense against rebel forces and access to the DRC’s rich
mineral wealth have been the primary reasons for the six
neighboring countries to enter the Congo war.
Where is the Front Line?
The front line of the war stretches all the way across the
Congo in zig-zag fashion from the northwest to the southeast. The
rebels and their backers control about 60 percent of the DRC to the
north and east of this line, while the government controls a smaller
area, about 40 percent of the DRC, south and west of this line.
What has been the impact on the population?
An estimated 1.7 million people have died as a result of the
two and a half year conflict in the DRC. Today a report came out
from an American NGO, the International Rescue Committee,
increasing that estimate to 3 million people. Most have died of
disease and malnutrition, with about 200,000 having died from the
fighting. Another two million have been displaced from their
homes. Over 300,000 have become refugees in the neighboring
countries of Tanzania, the Central African Republic, the Republic
of the Congo, and Zambia. According to the World Food Program,
one third of the population, or about 16 million people, are affected
by food shortages. Of these about two million are facing "critical
shortages." One third of the children are malnourished, 10 percent
of them acutely so.
The problem is that access to these populations is difficult.
The DRC’s vast size, its lack of infrastructure and rampant
insecurity block humanitarian organizations from reaching most at-risk
populations. Furthermore, resources are limited. The United
Nation’s Consolidated Appeal for 2000 had a 40 percent shortfall.
Donors contributed only $9.4 million of the $37 million requested.
Social services are practically non-existent. Government
spending on health and education decreased to less than one
percent of government expenditures for each. Most schools are not
operating. 75 percent of the population has no access to basic
healthcare.
In the areas where armed groups are active, be they regular
government forces or rebel groups, civilians have suffered terrible
abuse. Human Rights Watch reported in May 2000 on the eastern
DRC area under the control of the RCD Rwandan-backed rebels.
Of all the armed groups operating in the region it said: "They have
systematically violated international humanitarian law through
indiscriminate attacks on civilians, summary executions, torture
including rape, other kinds of cruel treatment, pillage, and the
destruction of civilian property." We can be sure that this
behavior is not confined to one area of the country but is
systematic throughout the conflict area.
Is there a solution?
From the beginning of the conflict in August 1998, there
were numerous attempts at mediation. Countries of SADC, the
Southern Africa Development Community, tried to broker a cease-fire
in meetings in Durban, Lusaka, and Gaberone. The OAU tried
at a meeting of African defense ministers in Addis Ababa. The
OAU Summit of 1998 in Ouagadougou tried. There were
meetings in Paris, Libya, and Rome. Finally, in July 1999, nearly
a year after the conflict began, all the parties to the conflict,
including the rebel groups, signed a peace accord in Lusaka,
Zambia. The Lusaka Accord, as it is known, called for the
establishment of a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops,
the disarming of all "negative" forces, meaning the Hutu militia
and the rebel forces, and a dialogue on the political future of the
country between the DRC government and the armed and unarmed
opposition groups. The Accord also called for the UN to provide
peacekeeping forces to ensure implementation.
A year and a half passed with little movement toward
implementation of the Lusaka Accord. The United Nations
Security Council did approve formation of a UN peacekeeping
force consisting of 500 unarmed military observers and 5,000
armed troops to support and protect them, but only a few of the
unarmed observers were deployed. None of the warring factions
withdrew from their positions; instead, some broke the cease-fire
and took up new forward positions. Chief among the obstacles
was DRC President Kabila. He rejected the good offices of the
former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, as facilitator of
the inter-Congolese dialogue and denied armed UN troops the right
to deploy in government-held areas. The Lusaka Accord seemed
all but dead.
Then, in January of this year, an unexpected turn of events
gave the process new life. Kabila was assassinated by one of his
bodyguards. His cronies appointed his 30-year-old son, Joseph
Kabila, to succeed him. Since his appointment, the younger Kabila
has concentrated his attention on reviving the peace process. He
approved unhindered deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces
and welcomed Masire as facilitator of the inter-Congolese
dialogue. He called for a timetable for disengagement of the
forces, deployment of the UN force, withdrawal of the uninvited
troops (Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi) and withdrawal of the
invited troops (Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia). Democracy, he
said, would come once the war was resolved. Then there could be
elections.
The UN Security Council fixed a timetable for
disengagement in a resolution passed at the end of February. It
called for all troops to begin disengagement as of March 15 and to
adopt plans for total withdrawal by May 15. Initial disengagement
plans called for a 15-kilometer pull back. Rwanda, in what it
called a good will gesture, withdrew 200 kilometers from Pweto in
the southeast. Uganda took several battalions out of the DRC all
together. Reports are that other troops began the pull-back on
schedule.
At the end of March, armed UN forces began to deploy to
both the rebel-held and government-held areas. Uraguayans to
Kalamie in the southeast. Senegalese to Kananga in central DRC
and to Mbandaka in the northwest. Problems came when the
Moroccan troops tried to deploy to Kisingani, the DRC’s third
largest city. The Rwandan-backed rebel group RCD denied the
plane landing rights on grounds that the UN should first condemn
the government’s cease-fire violations. In return, Kabila called for
the UN to place sanctions on Rwanda. This turned out to be a
minor setback. Deployment was soon allowed to proceed
following discussions between diplomats and the rebel leaders.
What has been the U.S. role?
Throughout the conflict, the U.S. policy has been aimed at
restoring peace and regional stability. It has urged implementation
of a negotiated settlement and has supported the Lusaka Accord.
Several high-level U.S. officials have visited the region for
discussions with the principal actors. Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs Susan Rice was an early visitor. Next came the
National Security Council’s Africa Director. At the end of 1999,
UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke went to the region to try to
get the faltering peace process back on track. He made the Congo
conflict the centerpiece of his "Africa month" at the UN Security
Council in January 2000. The U.S. continues to support the peace
process and just recently, when the disengagement of forces began,
the Department of State issued a statement hailing this process as
the first step toward real peace. Throughout the conflict, USAID
has maintained an active aid program in the DRC. The U.S. has
also contributed generously to address the humanitarian situation.
What is the prognosis for the future?
With the disengagement of forces beginning, the
deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to support the peace
accord compliance monitors, and the agreement to move forward
with the inter-Congolese dialogue, things are finally moving in the
right direction in the DRC. This does not mean that there are not
huge potential pitfalls ahead. I see at least four serious problems
ahead.
First, the ultimate withdrawal of Rwandan forces is
doubtful any time soon. President Kagame has stated on numerous
occasions that Rwanda will not withdraw completely until
Rwanda’s security is assured. By this he means that the Hutu
militia and former Hutu army must be disarmed and settled
somewhere where they will no longer pose a threat to Rwanda. In
Washington in February Kagame called for the international
community to withdraw support from the Interahamwe, perhaps in
the form of a UN Security Council resolution. Without support,
such as that coming from the DRC government, he reasoned that
the militia structure would crumble and the group would no longer
pose a threat. Both of Kagame’s conditions -- disarmament and
resettlement -- are problematic, however, and lead me to the
second potential pitfall.
The disarmament of the armed groups, as called for in the
Lusaka Accord, is an extremely difficult task and one that no one
is anxious to take on. Look at Sierra Leone in West Africa, for
example, where voluntary disarmament of the rebel group, the
RUF, has been underway for nearly two years now. Success has
been minimal. Armed groups generally have little incentive to
give up their arms voluntarily, and there is little chance that they
can be forcibly disarmed. This is a huge problem facing the UN
and the parties to the Lusaka Accord.
Third, the conduct of the inter-Congolese dialogue seems to
me to offer serious problems. The appointed facilitator, former
president Ketumile Masire of Botswana, recently talked to all the
potential participants and reported “no areas of disagreement”
about the proposed dialogue. Nevertheless, it is my belief that
differences do exist that will be difficult to overcome. Opposition
leader Etienne Tshisekedi visited us at the Fund for Peace just last
month. He told us that he sees the dialogue picking up where the
sovereign national conference of the early 1990’s left off. That is,
starting with him appointed Prime Minister. But there are new
players now, the rebel groups, and this starting point is unlikely to
be acceptable to them. They do not even recognize young Kabila
as a legitimate president of the country.
Last, but by no means least, I think it will be very difficult
for the rebel groups and foreign armies to let go of the mineral
resources of the DRC that they have been exploiting to finance
their war activities. Access to mineral resources has been central
to this conflict. A UN panel of experts that has been studying the
illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources made their
findings public just two weeks ago. They said that plundering --
mass-scale looting and the systemic exploitation of the natural
resources -- was going on "at an alarming rate." The report listed
five key minerals -- coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt, and gold -- as
being systematically exploited. It said that plundering, looting,
racketeering and criminal cartels were commonplace in the
occupied territories. The panel reported that a number of
companies had fueled the conflict directly by trading arms for
natural resources, while others had facilitated access to funds to
purchase weapons. Needless to say, this report is controversial and
Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda deny involvement in such
plundering.
So, while I hope that the moves on the peace front since
young Kabila came to power in January will result in real progress,
we must realize that it will not happen overnight. It will be a long
process that will need skillful management and good will on all
sides. Only then can we expect these moves to translate into peace
for the region.
Ambassador Joyce E. Leader is a Senior Fellow
of The Fund for Peace.
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