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How does internal conflict strengthen or weaken a state?
Contrary to popular perception, which views internal conflict as
a cause of state collapse, the process often works the other way
around. That is, state collapse causes ethnic or internal conflict.
Our central theoretical assumption, therefore, is
that internal conflict is a pathology of the state. The root
causes of deterioration may be deep, as indicated earlier in
discussing the factors that may predispose a society toward
conflict. However, the proximate causes usually lie in
factors that foment political decay at the center, including
poor governance, institutional degeneration, corruption, and,
most of all, destructive leadership. When the center
dissolves, factionalization increases as loyalties shift from
the state to more traditional communities and local leaders
that offer psychic satisfaction and physical protection.
Unless the process is reversed, it may result in communal
violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide.
To assess the potential for mass violence, one should look
not only at evidence of rising communal hostility, but also
at wider societal trends associated with decay. This is particularly
true in plural societies that lack the institutional infrastructure
or leadership to cope with crises. Because quantitatively-based
indicators of state decay are underdeveloped and often unreliable
in disintegrating states, one must examine a full array of
social, economic, military and political variables, taking
into account the particular circumstances of societies at risk.
In the model presented here, there are twelve societal
indicators identified that appear frequently in collapsing states.
Not all must be present for impending collapse.
However, the greater the number and intensity of these
indicators, the higher the risk of internal conflict and violence.
Since internal conflict is essentially a pathology
of the state, state-building should be at the heart of
peace efforts in collapsed states. It is important to
note that "state-building" is not synonymous with "nation-building,"
a more expansive goal which involves rehabilitating the
economy and reestablishing civil society. Nation-building
should be the primary responsibility of local leaders,
not of foreign intermediaries. International aid and
assistance may be needed, but it should be coordinated with,
and not divert attention from, the central goal of
achieving sustainable security or reconstituting the minimum
elements of a state. Somalia in the 1990s, for example, has
a clan-based civil society and a working economy, but no
sustainable security because it lacks state institutions and
a central government.
This "state-centered approach" should not be confused with
a "statist approach," which views conflict in terms of
hierarchical power struggles among elites. To the contrary,
it is absolutely essential to understand the relationship
between the state and society. As a state fails, people seek
security and attempt to advance their interests through traditional
or historical social bonds. Ample opportunities exist in
this kind of environment for factional leaders to play
on group fears and loyalties, using narrow nationalism
as a means of pursuing and holding on to power. To break
such a cycle, the institutional basis of a legitimate
state must be reconstituted, both to end domination
by factionalized elites, and to restore public confidence
in a system of governance that goes beyond communal interests.
In sum, this model is based on the assumption that state
failure is a primary cause of internal or ethnic conflict,
not the reverse as is commonly thought. The model posits
state building as the basis of a potential strategy for
resolving or managing such conflict.
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