



The Fund for Peace

Conflict Prevention and Recovery Program

Redefining Diplomacy: New Actors, Tools and Strategies

Prepared by

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This report is based on a series of three workshops sponsored by The Department of State, which were held on May 8, June 9 and July 14, 2000. Utilizing a framework developed by The Fund for Peace, several scholars and practitioners analyzed ten case studies. Although the full methodology was not applied, basic definitions, concepts and indicators from The Fund's model were used for comparative analysis of internal conflicts to draw lessons for the future. The conclusions and recommendations are solely the responsibility of The Fund for Peace and DO NOT necessarily reflect the views of the State Department or the workshop participants, who provided several insights.

As the sole remaining superpower, everybody is turning to us. Everybody thinks we're going to help in the reordering of the world. But it's all self-ordering right now, and when you self-order, it's like the roll of the dice. We are not doing enough to direct or structure a new order.... We need to revamp the entire engagement program."

Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni (retired) in "The Proconsuls: Patrolling the World; An Engagement in 10 Time Zones," Washington Post, September 29, 2000

The most pressing danger [in Kosovo] stems from criminal enterprises run by ethnic Albanians who already have made this corner of the Balkans into a European hub for trafficking in narcotics, illegal aliens, stolen cars and prostitutes.... Taking on the criminals is all the more difficult because of their links to local leaders, including many of the ethnic Albanian nationalists who fought the Serbs and are treated as heroes in their communities. 'We call it the thuggery,' said a senior U.S. Army officer. 'The mafia, the politicians and the so-called freedom fighters are all connected.'

"In Kosovo, an Uncertain Mission," Washington Post, September 20, 2000

The repeated complaint that the United States does more than its fair share in global peacekeeping operations is simply untrue.... Overall, of the 37,350 troops currently deployed in U.N. peacekeeping operations, the United States deploys well under one percent of the total. To be sure, that is as it should be, given the many other global U.S. responsibilities. But the notion, frequently heard these days, that the United States is doing too much peacekeeping is simply untenable.

Ivo H. Daalder in "Don't Pull Out of the Balkans," Washington Post, September 28, 2000

The UN completed a major study on peacekeeping. It's a rather frank exposition/critique with a long list of recommendations for a new way ahead. Among the many recommendations is one to establish what amounts to an office for crisis warning, database keeping, event and developments monitoring.... [Imagine] what would it be like if several major security organizations [did this, ending] up with a common methodology, common terminology and a common software application interconnected through a common, probably unclassified, but protected WAN.

Patrick Duecy, U.S. Civilian Head, NATO Intelligence, September 2000

1. THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

The U.S. will confront complex international challenges in the 21st century, many of which will not respond to traditional foreign policy approaches. Foremost among these is the challenge of containing violent internal conflicts caused by failing states and inter-communal rivalries. Collectively, these conflicts have caused more deaths since the collapse of the Berlin Wall than terrorism and interstate wars combined, with an estimated five million fatalities in the last decade, mostly women and children.

There is no consensus in the U.S. on whether these conflicts are on the wane or proliferating, whether they are becoming more easily resolved or more intractable, or whether they are important to American national interests or of peripheral concern. However, international apprehension over the impact of internal violence on international security is forcing both multilateral organizations and national governments to search for new ways to better approach the problem.

2. WHY THIS SERIES OF WORKSHOPS?

The U.S. tends to deal with these challenges in what is perceived as an ad hoc fashion, reinventing the wheel with each new crisis. To explore ways to meet these challenges via larger conceptual frameworks, the State Department convened a series of workshops to examine comparative historical situations to learn lessons for current and future crises. For instance, one workshop participant noted that the war in Sierra Leone had some parallels with civil conflicts in Cambodia and Mozambique, but little reference was made to either of these experiences when the U.S. was considering its policy responses.

The goal of the workshops was to develop analytical skills, and identify new approaches, for proactive responses to internal conflicts. Conference participants included U.S. government officials plus a number of prominent scholars and experts.

Ten geographically diverse countries were examined over the course of three days, with at least one country in Africa, the most conflicted continent in the world, included in each session. Day 1 focused on pre-conflict responses -- Prediction, Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, with Russia, Zimbabwe and South Korea as case studies. Day 2 was devoted to interventions in ongoing conflicts -- Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peace Building, with Kosovo, South Africa, Cambodia and Sierra Leone as examples. Day 3 covered post-conflict Economic and Political Reconstruction, with Bosnia, Haiti and Mozambique as illustrations.

3. METHODOLOGY

A common analytical framework was employed in the workshops based on a methodology designed by Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President of The Fund for Peace. Spelled out in detail in “An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: A Manual for Practitioners” (The Fund for Peace, 1998), the methodology has been widely tested and refined, with customized software and training programs available for different users. For purposes of the workshops, however, four elements of the methodology were highlighted.

First, the model’s **conceptual framework** was presented. It maps out five stages in the life cycle of a conflict: (1) root causes, (2) immediate causes, (3) transition (to a violent or non-violent track), (4) state transformation, and (5) outcomes. The potential role of the international community is defined in each stage, from early warning and preventive diplomacy to post-conflict economic and political integration. (See Appendix A.) The framework allows analysts to identify where in the conflict life cycle a particular situation lies. For example, Bosnia should be in the post-conflict phase (stage 5), but upon closer examination is suspended in stage three, between full-scale conflict (prevented by the presence of international forces) and state reforms (blocked by local forces).

Second, the **twelve top indicators of internal conflict** were outlined. (See Appendix B). The indicators offer a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of a country in distress, similar to the way a doctor conducts a medical diagnosis of a patient suffering from an imprecise illness, such as an autoimmune disease. To make a diagnosis in which there is no authoritative physical test, a physician looks for clusters of known symptoms of the disease, both qualitative and quantitative. Similarly, in examining state pathology, analysts may assess clusters of known symptoms of state decay to determine whether a country is deteriorating or recovering from conflict. These assessments are conducted using standard indicators of state collapse, which can be evaluated to establish trend lines over time.

Third, the goal of outside intervention was defined as “**sustainable security**” -- **the ability of a country to resolve its own problems peacefully without an external military or administrative presence**. Promoting effective governance through institution-building establishes the basis for an “exit strategy” that is more modest and doable than democratization and nation building, objectives that may take decades to achieve and should be directed by local leaders.

Finally, to achieve sustainable security, a country must, among other things, develop professionalism and competency of the “**core four**” **state institutions**: the police, the military, the civil service and the system of justice, all of which should operate under the rule of law. Outsiders can play useful roles in these tasks, but they often concentrate exclusively on political settlements, elections, power-sharing arrangements and economic growth. While these are certainly important, they fail to address the problem of building an institutional infrastructure of governance, which is the foundation of political stability and economic growth.

Each of the ten case studies was examined using these concepts as a common analytical framework for comparative perspectives. The major substantive findings are summarized below.

4. FINDINGS

Conference participants expressed their belief that the following points most clearly define the

overarching issues affecting the development of a proactive policy approach to internal conflicts. Participants found that:

- New analytical paradigms are needed to overcome the tendency to fall back on cold war attitudes and practices. It is not sufficient to identify the “good guys” from the “bad guys,” or presume that elections will, in themselves, bring legitimacy and stability to a country in crisis, as was done in Haiti, for example. Premature elections can reinforce nationalistic or repressive leaders if they are conducted before confidence in the state is restored. Moreover, individual leaders, such as Serbia’s Milosevic and Haiti’s Aristide, may shift ground, agreeing to bring peace one day, and opposing it the next. Instead of focusing on individuals so heavily, we should build enduring state institutions in which the “good guys,” if they win elections, can govern effectively for sustainable security.
- Internal conflicts can spiral out of control, crossing borders, drawing in outside actors, and intertwining with other regional crises. This occurred in the Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in Cambodia, Sierra Leone and El Salvador. Participants recommended that U.S. agencies have a coordinated early response that enables rapid decision-making for preventive action before internal conflicts become internationalized or too far along to be addressed in an effective way. Late responses during the transition or transformation stages are far more complex, costly, dangerous and controversial.
- Institutional mechanisms for timely preventive diplomacy are needed, including creating career incentives in the Foreign Service to reward success. For example, external policy-makers had a window of opportunity to influence Russia in 1992, but they hesitated as the country descended into crony capitalism, organized crime, and economic decline. Policy-makers know that tensions are mounting in Zimbabwe, but no major preventive diplomacy initiatives are underway to contain the political turmoil.
- The sequence, timing and nature of preventive action can tip the balance when a country is at a decision-point, hovering between war and peace. Deciding precisely what role the U.S. should play in each case and moving decisively and consistently is critical. In South Korea, the U.S. approach was appropriately hands-on. For instance, the U.S. intervened in 1981 in

South Korea to save the life of Kim Dae Jung – a Nobel Peace Laureate who now heads a democratic South Korea pioneering a rapprochement with North Korea – when he had been sentenced to death. Furthermore, in 1987, the U.S. urged Chun Doo-Hwan to step down and allow a peaceful transfer of power at a time of mounting demonstrations against Chun's efforts to maintain his grip on power. By contrast, the U.S. determined correctly that it should take an arms-length position during the transition in South Africa, deferring to local leaders. The U.S. did not support the call for U.N. peacekeepers, even when violence risked failure. Instead, Washington played a facilitating role by lending advice, aid and support through an outstanding ambassador who reached out to parties from all political persuasions and by encouraging closer ties with South African civil organizations.

- Some countries appear to be better positioned than others to be receptive to preventive diplomacy for a variety of reasons. In South Korea, for example, strong national identity held the country together and close security ties between the two countries permitted the U.S. to exercise influence there. South Africa, though racially split, had a strong sense of ownership of the negotiations, high quality leadership, and a strong civil society that was engaged in a National Peace Accord to support actions taken at the top, features that gave the country a solid foundation upon which to build. In Mozambique, the end of the cold war and the role of a credible and independent interlocutor (Sant' Egidio, a Catholic non-governmental organization based in Rome) opened opportunities to end a debilitating 17-year long war. Participants said that identifying countries that are more likely to succeed from those that are not, along with the issue of timing, are subjects deserving more research.
- External intervention at any stage must be focused, sustained, integrated and credible. In Sierra Leone, the Lome Peace Agreement conceded too much to the rebels, who used the settlement as another way to wage war; they imported arms to attack the government by selling illicit diamonds over which they retained control. In Cambodia, the international community could not or did not always enforce agreements when they were violated. In Bosnia, some provisions of the Dayton Accord have not been fully implemented, especially on human rights. In all these instances, there was insufficient strength exercised by the

international community to enforce peace agreements. If it is known in advance that it will not be possible to do what is needed, contingency plans should be drawn up for the “worst case” situations, including preparing for backsliding into violence, as occurred in Kosovo when local groups instigated revenge against the Serbs.

- Governments need to be prepared to work with non-traditional actors, including local and international non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, and the business community, all of whom may be more effective than governments or international organizations in rebuilding a country’s infrastructure, cultivating civil society, and fostering economic and political reconstruction. For example, human rights organizations have been especially helpful in countries lacking a tradition of democracy, such as Cambodia and Bosnia; a Catholic NGO was the mediator in Mozambique after the failure of previous attempts, and the local business community has facilitated negotiations for the creation of a central government in Somalia after ten years of chaos.
- The information revolution and the media provide non-traditional actors with new reach and powers, which can be used for good or bad. “Hate radio” is prevalent in many conflicts. However, independent radio, aided by the Internet, facilitated a growing political opposition in the Balkans; television brought pictures of South African violence into American living rooms, fueling the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S.; a UN–operated radio station helped equalize access to information, promote reconciliation, and persuade prospective first-time voters that their ballot would be truly secret; and the Internet mobilized exiles in the Sierra Leone Diaspora to lobby for aid and outside intervention.
- The best way to contain an internal conflict is to anticipate it before it appears on the radar screen as a crisis with significant internal political violence. This requires a systematic early warning system based on a global watch, using a common analytical framework for consistent evaluation over time. The U.S. also needs to be able to respond quickly, if it chooses, to define the U.S. role, including the limits and opportunities of preventive diplomacy. Policy makers should value functional expertise in this field (e.g., conflict resolution and early warning skills) as much they value regional expertise.

5. WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

❖ Create a Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) in the Office of the Secretary of State

A Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit that coordinates end-to-end analyses that are periodically updated, monitors new developments, issues warnings and makes specific policy recommendations for preventive diplomacy should be established within the Office of the Secretary of State. A senior official should head this unit, designated as Ambassador at Large for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, who reports directly to the Secretary. In coordination with support from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Intelligence Council (NIC), and regional bureaus, the CPRU would be the center for monitoring volatile situations using a systematic analytical methodology in a consistent review of countries in distress. It would be the chief coordinating body for conflict prevention among all relevant agencies, recommending appropriate leadership roles for the U.S. The CPRU must be allocated sufficient human and financial resources to be able react quickly and advise the Secretary of State in a timely fashion. The staff should consist of an experienced team of regional and conflict resolution experts able to work effectively with relevant government agencies and non-governmental organizations. CPRU liaisons should also coordinate closely with relevant non-governmental organizations.

The value of the new unit is that it will:

- Be *dedicated to early warning and assessment* for preventive action
- Have a *common analytical framework and methodology* for systematic analysis over time
- Make *concrete and timely policy recommendations* to the Secretary of State, and
- Permit *comparative perspectives and shared experiences* in conflict resolution practices.

When an event occurs, the question before the CPRU will not be "What should be our immediate diplomatic response?" but rather "How does this event fit into the long-term prognosis for the country and what can be done to prevent violent conflict?" (A useful list of

diplomatic options is contained in a matrix of U.S. Foreign Policy Tools prepared by the Sanctions Working Group of the State Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, in Appendix C).

The Ambassador at Large who heads the unit should have the authority to convene and chair an Interagency Working Group (IWG) if an early warning alert is made, and forward recommendations to the Secretary of State. This would allow the State Department to institutionalize early warning. The CPRU should work closely with the regional bureaus and intelligence agencies, some of which have already begun to develop units that support this function. The NIC might be asked to lead regular reviews of countries to identify those in danger of internal conflict, using a common methodology. In these ways, the CPRU would not duplicate the analytical functions of the intelligence agencies and be able to concentrate on policy-making.

❖ **Create a Corps of Specialists**

To be prepared, the USG, perhaps under the leadership of the CPRU, should create and maintain a list of specialists, in and outside of government, who can be deployed in the short, medium and long term to fulfill critical roles in conflict situations. The list should strive to build a corps of civilian reserve specialists who can be deployed rapidly for diplomatic assignments in cases of impending conflict. “Civilian reservists” should be versed in various functions, including addressing security infrastructure needs and establishing, training and professionalizing core state institutions. They should consist of a range of civilian experts, including judges, engineers, lawyers, police officers, corrections officials, customs agents, school administrators, teachers, doctors, health care workers, infectious disease experts, accountants, etc. to get state institutions running again and to provide public services. In addition, specialists should include trainers who are able to transmit skills and knowledge to local nationals who can fulfill these roles as part of a long-term peace strategy.

The Peace Corps’s mission could also be expanded to train personnel for overseas assignments, focusing on preventive intervention. USAID could establish a center for preventive action, working closely with the CPRU and the Peace Corps, for economic reconstruction.

❖ **Create Incentives in the Foreign Service Personnel System for Conflict Prevention**

The incentive system in the Foreign Service favors diplomats who resolve conflicts rather than preventing them. Personnel evaluations should include criteria that enhance the capability of the Foreign Service to be more effective in this regard, including assessing the effectiveness of diplomats in analysis, outreach, information-sharing and conflict resolution skills. Incentives should include appropriate pay, promotion and recognition rewards. Personnel evaluations should highlight skills in analysis, outreach, and information sharing used to prevent conflicts. The Foreign Service Institute should also conduct courses in the theory and practice of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, working with universities and non-governmental organizations that are best known in this field.

❖ **Focus on Long-Term Sustainable Security**

Policy recommendations for conflict prevention should focus on measures that enhance sustainable security, a precondition for pursuing other long-term foreign policy goals, such as democracy and free markets. Currently, the emphasis is placed on military security, political agreements, power-sharing accords and elections. However important these objectives may be, they cannot substitute for strong governmental institutions. State building is the weak link in peacemaking efforts.

6. WORKSHOP CONCLUSION

Whether the U.S. chooses to limit its intervention, or take a leadership role in peace initiatives, it will need to rethink its role with regard to internal conflicts, strengthen its diplomatic capacity for preventive diplomacy, and establish more expertise to adapt to the new environment.

“The problem of humanitarian intervention,” said Richard Haass, “is in some ways the emblematic problem of the first post-Cold War decade.” The U.S. cannot avoid addressing this problem. The only question is whether it is done ineptly or wisely. The workshops offered several

insights on how to do it more effectively, more systematically, more cheaply, and without the disadvantage of being caught by surprise. Participants concluded that the time for rethinking diplomacy is long overdue.


**STAGE 1
(ROOT CAUSES)**

**STAGE 2
(IMMEDIATE
CAUSES)**

**STAGE 3
(TRANSITION)**

**STAGE 4
(TRANSFORMATION OF
THE STATE)**

**STAGE 5
(OUTCOME)**



POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

PREDICTION
EARLY WARNING

PREVENTIVE
DIPLOMACY

PEACE ENFORCEMENT
PEACEMAKING

PEACEKEEPING
PEACEBUILDING

POST-CONFLICT
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
INTEGRATION

Appendix B: Measures of the Twelve Top Indicators Of Internal Conflict and State Collapse

Social Indicators:

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures

- ◆ Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources
- ◆ Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship, etc.
- ◆ Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards
- ◆ Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups

2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

- ◆ Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia

- ◆ History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries
- ◆ Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups
- ◆ Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression
- ◆ Institutionalized political exclusion
- ◆ Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of “hate” radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

- ◆ “Brain drain” of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression
- ◆ Voluntary emigration of “the middle class,” particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration
- ◆ Growth of exile communities

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines

- ◆ Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status
- ◆ Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels, etc.
- ◆ Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

- ◆ A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures
- ◆ Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments
- ◆ Collapse or devaluation of the national currency
- ◆ Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs
- ◆ Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight
- ◆ Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace
- ◆ Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments

Political Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State

- ◆ Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- ◆ Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
- ◆ Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- ◆ Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

- ◆ Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation, etc.
- ◆ State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, etc.

9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

- ◆ Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated
- ◆ Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians
- ◆ Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices
- ◆ Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution)

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”

- ◆ Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity
- ◆ Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition
- ◆ Emergence of an “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique
- ◆ Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites

- ◆ Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines
- ◆ Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”)

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors

- ◆ Military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict

APPENDIX C

U.S. Foreign Policy Tools An Illustrative Matrix of Selected Options

	Friendly, Persuasive	Hostile, Coercive
Diplomatic <i>(Executive)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy Open/Expand • Ambassador: Accredited • Visa: Liberalize • Landing Rights: Extend/Expand • Binational Comms: Establish/Expand • Int'l Org: Support Membership/Position • Int'l Conf: Support Spans/Participate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State Visit Support • Senior Officials Exchange: Support • Hostile Neighbors/Opposition: Minimize Contact
Political <i>(Executive and Legislative)</i>	<p>Legislative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolutions: Friendly • Codels: Increase • NBD: Increase Funding • Int'l Parliamentary Orgs: Support Participation/Position • Opposition: Minimize Contact • Arms Transactions: Support 	<p>Executive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proclamation: Friendly • State/Local Exchanges, Sister City Agreements, State Offices, Overseas - Support
Cultural <i>(Executive and Legislative)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggressive Broadcasts: Decrease/Suspend • Academic Exchanges: Establish/Expand • Int'l Athletic Events: Support Participation/Sponsorship • Entertainment/Cultural Tours: Support Participation/Sponsorship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace Corps: Expand • Public Exchange: Establish/Expand • International Cultural Orgs: Support Membership • Scientific Coop: Establish/Expand • Internet Sites: Establish/Expand
Economic <i>(Executive and Legislative)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debt Rescheduling: Permit/Liberalize Terms • Pref. Tariff Treatment: Expand • Reg. Trade Agreements: Permit Participation • Trade Credits: Expand • Investment: Expand Promotion • Business Contacts: Encourage • Trade Missions: Expand • OPIC/EXIM/TDA: Open/Expand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade Controls: Liberalize • Double Tax Agent: Negotiate • Tax Treaty: Negotiate • IFI's: Support Membership/Position • Financial Controls: Relax • Assets: Release • Postal Coop: Expand • Aid/Technical Assistance: Increase
Military <i>(Executive and Legislative)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training (IMET/E-IMET): Increase • Officer Exchange: Increase • Military Coop (joint exercises/training/ tech coop): Increase • Port Visits: Increase • Confidence-Building Measures: Increase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peacekeeping Forces: Maintain • Coop w/ Hostile Neighbors/Opposition: Restrict • Local Maneuvers: Restrict
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy: Reduce Staff • Ambassador: Recall for Consultations • Visas: Restrict for Targeted Groups • Landing Rights: Restrict • Binational Commissions: Pare Back • Int'l Org: Oppose Membership/Position • Int'l Conferences: Oppose Spans/Particip • Communique: Hostile • State Visits: Oppose • Sr. Officials Exchange: Restrict
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embassy: Close • Ambassador: Withdraw • Visas: Suspend • Landing Rights: Suspend • Binational Commissions: Suspend • Int'l Org: Urge Exclusion • Int'l Conferences: Urge Exclusion • State Visits: Cancel • Sr. Officials Exchange: Cancel • Hostile Neighbors/Opp: Expand Contact
		<p>Legislative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolutions: Hostile • Codels: Fact-Finding Missions • NBD: Restrict Funding • Int'l Parliamentary Orgs: Oppose • Opposition: Increase Contact • Arms: Cancel Trans/Boycott
		<p>Executive</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proclamation: Hostile • Opposition: Host Visit
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggressive Broadcasts: Increase • Academic Exchange: Restrict • Int'l Athletic Events: Oppose Participation/ Sponsorship • Entertainment/Cultural Tours: Oppose Participation/Sponsorship • Peace Corps: Restrict • Publication Exchange: Restrict • Int'l Cultural Orgs: Oppose Membership • Scientific Cooperation: Restrict
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Academic Exchange: Suspend • Int'l Athletic Events: Urge Exclusion • Entertainment/Cultural Tours: Ban from US Entry/Urge Exclusion • Peace Corps: Suspend • Publications Exchange: Suspend • Int'l Cultural Orgs: Urge Suspension • Scientific Coop: Suspend
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debt: Tighten Terms • Investment: Restrict Promotion • Business Contact: Discourage • Trade Missions: Pare • OPIC/EXIM/TDA: Restrict to Targeted Basis • Trade Controls: Limited (commod/product based) • Trade Restrictions: Limited (commod/product based) • IFI's: Oppose Membership/Position • Financial Controls: Increase • Aid/Technical Assistance: Restrict
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debt: Suspend • Pref. Tariff Treatment: Suspend • Regional Tr Agents: Suspend Participation • Trade Credits: Restrict • Investment: Ban • Business Contact: Ban • Trade Missions: Suspend • OPIC/EXIM/TDA: Suspend • Trade Controls: Expanded • Trade Embargo • Double Tax Agreement: Suspend • Tax Treaty: Suspend • IFI's: Urge Exclusion • Assets: Freeze • Postal Cooperation: Suspend • Aid/Technical Assistance: Suspend • G7 Sanctions Group: Activate
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training: Restrict • Officer Exchange: Restrict • Military Cooperation: Restrict • Confidence-Building Measures
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training: Suspend • Officer Exchange: Suspend • Military Cooperation: Suspend • Port Visits: Suspend • Confidence-Building Measures: Suspend • Peacekeeping: Withdraw • Coop w/ Neighbors/Opposition: Increase • Show of Force • Act of War

Prepared by: Sanctions Working Group, State Department Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy

Key: IFI = International Financial Institution, OPIC = Overseas Private Investment corporation, EXIM = Export-Import Bank, TDA = Trade and Development Agency, GSM = General Sales Manager (USDA Export Credits)