|
Also available: 2006, 2007 and 2008 country profiles.
Basic Information Location: Southern Asia, northwest of Pakistan, east of Iran Population Size: 33.6 million Ethnic Composition: 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, 2% Baloch, and 4% other Religious Composition: 80% Sunni Muslim, 19% Shia Muslim, 1% other Languages: 50% Afghan Persian or Dari (official language), 35% Pashto, 11% Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen), 4% 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashtai) Major Exports: opium, fruits and nuts, hand-woven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semi-precious gems GDP per Capita (PPP): $800 Historical Overview After struggles between British and Russian control, Afghanistan was finally recognized as a fully independent monarchy by Britain in 1921. King Muhammad Zahir Shah ruled Afghanistan for four decades before he was deposed in a coup in 1973, when Mohammad Daud established an Afghan republic. Daud was overthrown and killed in 1978 by Marxist factions, which were largely supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union then proceeded to invade Afghanistan through the support of its leftist allies, but was finally overpowered by U.S.-backed mujahideen guerrilla fighters in 1989. After their victory against the Soviets, the mujahideen were internally fragmented and fell into a bloody civil conflict over control of Kabul. In 1996, Kabul finally fell under the control of a Pakistani-backed Taliban militia to end the civil war, while parts of northern and central Afghanistan remained under the control of the ethnic Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. Following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States led a military campaign to overthrow the Taliban and eliminate Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, al-Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan. The December 2001 Bonn Conference created an interim government which established a process of political reconstruction, introduced a new constitution, and planned to hold presidential elections by 2004. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun tribal leader, won Afghanistan’s first presidential elections in October 2004, and a National Assembly was inaugurated a year later. However, in spite of democratic gains, Karzai’s young Afghan government is still threatened by the resurgence of the Taliban and political instability in many of the regions south and east of Kabul. Furthermore, civil instability, organized crime, corruption, and narcotics trafficking further challenge the government’s ability to extend the rule of law.
Social Indicators All of Afghanistan’s social indicators either worsened or stayed the same in the FSI 2009. The demographic pressures indicator increased from 9.1 in the FSI 2008 to 9.3 in the FSI 2009. Afghanistan has a high population growth rate of about 2.69% per year, a large youth bulge (with 44.6% of the population under the age of 15), and a high infant mortality rate of 152 deaths per 1,000 live births. Furthermore, there are reportedly about 400,000 orphans in Afghanistan and an estimated seven million people remain susceptible to hunger throughout the country. Afghanistan is also vulnerable to natural disasters as well as a high risk of diseases. The indicator for refugees and displaced persons remained at the high score of 8.9 in the FSI 2009. Although more than 3.7 million Afghan refugees have returned to their homes in the past six years, several million still live in Pakistan and Iran. In the first quarter of 2008, an estimated 13,000 people were newly displaced as violence occurred in previously safe areas. About 132,000 people are internally displaced as a result of drought, violence and instability. Afghanistan’s group grievance indicator worsened from 9.5 in the FSI 2008 to 9.6 in the FSI 2009. The increase of Taliban-led extremist violence has resulted in the highest level of insurgency-related violence since U.S. forces invaded the country in 2001—as of September of 2008, more than 4,000 people have been killed, including 1,445 civilians. As the Taliban has utilized safe havens in Pakistan, they have been able to increase their strength in attempts to regain control of Afghanistan. In June 2008, the Taliban engineered a massive jail-break from the Kandahar prison, freeing at least 350 insurgents. The human flight indicator worsened from 7.0 in the FSI 2008 to 7.2 in the FSI 2009. Due to the instability and violence that has occurred in the past two decades, many professional, educated and middle-class Afghans have left the country as refugees or economic migrants. In 2008, there were 21 migrants for every 1,000 Afghans, one of the highest outward migration rates in the world.
Economic Indicators Afghanistan’s uneven development indicator worsened from 8.1 in the FSI 2008 to 8.4 in the FSI 2009. As many as 18 million Afghans still live on less than $2 a day and five million Afghans live under the poverty line. Although 80% of Afghanistan’s population works in the agricultural sector, 69% of the economy relies on industry and services. However, Afghanistan’s illicit drug industry, which comprises 60% or more of the Afghan economy, is not included in Afghanistan’s economic growth. In 2008, the Taliban’s income from opium trafficking alone was estimated at $100 million. Afghanistan’s economic indicator improved slightly from 8.5 in the FSI 2008 to 8.3 in the FSI 2009. Afghanistan’s GDP growth exceeded 7% in 2008. However, Afghanistan still suffers from an unemployment rate of 40%, $8.5 billion of external debt, and a GDP per capita of $800, making it one of the world’s poorest countries.
Political/Military Indicators All of Afghanistan’s political and military indicators worsened in the FSI 2009. The indicator for the legitimacy of the state worsened from 9.2 in the FSI 2008 to 9.8 in the FSI 2009 as a result of the government’s inability to combat corruption, militant violence, and drug trafficking. Afghanistan’s security situation deteriorated, with 2008 considered to be the bloodiest year since the end of the NATO operation in 2001. In November 2008, the Taliban rejected a peace offer by President Karzai, stating that no negotiations can be made until all foreign troops have left Afghanistan. Meanwhile, many individuals within the government are still corrupt and operate with impunity. Karzai’s hardliner approach to combating corruption has not made significant progress, with Afghanistan still considered to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 176th out of 180 in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perception Index. Afghanistan’s public services indicator also worsened significantly from 8.3 in the FSI 2008 to 8.9 in the FSI 2009. An estimated 57% of men and 87% of women are still considered illiterate, reducing Afghanistan’s ability to develop economically. Other problems include insufficient access to water, sanitation, and healthcare. An estimated one-quarter of the population have no access to health care and there is only about one medical facility for every 27,000 Afghans. The long-standing conflict has also devastated Afghanistan’s infrastructure and transportation systems. The human rights indicator worsened from 8.4 in the FSI 2008 to 8.8 in the FSI 2009. There have been widespread human rights violations against civilians in Afghanistan. Attacks on journalists, aid workers, political activists, and schools have been rampant, and discrimination against women and minority groups occurs regularly. Afghanistan’s National Security Directorate has been accused of operating its own prisons and torturing its detainees, and the local militias are reported to have done the same. Warlords in the north have used property destruction, rape, and murder to prevent displaced Pashtuns from reclaiming their homes. The indicator for the security apparatus worsened from 9.6 in the FSI 2008 to 9.9 in the FSI 2009. In spite of Karzai’s attempt to promote peace talks and create alliances with neighboring administrations, it was unable to control the Taliban-led attacks, which steadily worsened throughout 2008. Afghanistan’s factionalized elites indicator also worsened from 8.8 in the FSI 2008 to 9.1 in the FSI 2009 as a result of the extreme ethnic and political polarization within the government and among the warring factions. Afghanistan’s score for external influence remained at the high score of 10.0 in FSI 2009. Although the Taliban have demanded the departure of all foreign troops in Afghanistan, the foreign presence increased in 2008 due to growing instability. In June 2008, the number of British troops in the country increased to 8,000 and the United States deployed an additional 4,500 troops. Other NATO allies also increased their troop strength throughout 2008. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s war-torn economy is still largely dependent on foreign aid. Reconstruction aid from USAID alone in the past eight years has amounted to $32 billion.
Core Five State Institutions | Leadership | Military | Police | Judiciary | Civil Service |  |  |  |  |  | | Poor | Poor | Poor | Poor | Poor |
President Hamid Karzai faces the challenges of tackling opium production and combating regional militias and warlords. However, the ineffectiveness of his own administration, which is plagued by corruption, has impeded his ability to deal with many of Afghanistan’s problems. Complex regional power struggles have forced President Karzai to support certain opium traffickers and warlord militias in attempt to gain countrywide cooperation. Since his election, Karzai’s administration has been unable to overcome factional militias, improve economic conditions, handle pervasive corruption, and create an Afghan political identity. Since 2002, the U.S. has invested in rebuilding the Afghan National Army (ANA), which, although it has shown improvement, still has a weak capacity. Currently the strength of the ANA is about 80,000 troops, but it is still largely dependent on foreign assistance, training and leadership. Due to the weakness of the military, Afghanistan’s police forces have often been the sole defense for civilians against insurgent attacks in many parts of the country. However, the Afghan police service is still largely understaffed, under-resourced, and under-funded. It is also prone to human rights abuses, corruption, and even torture. Afghanistan’s judiciary system is fairly new and very fragile. Due to the frailty of the national government there is no effective nationwide legal system, and independent judicial branches do not have the proper funding, education or training. Thus, there is a significant amount of outside influence in legal procedures and many judges are subject to threats by local warlords or armed militias. Some areas of Afghanistan that are controlled by the Taliban still employ Shariah courts which promote a harsh form of Islamic law. The civil service is inefficient, weak and corrupt. After decades of chronic brain drain, there are few skilled, competent or professional civil servants in the new government.
Prognosis Afghanistan faces significant nation-building challenges, including combating the Taliban, the widespread poppy cultivation, and the deterioration of many state institutions. These challenges result in more chronic patterns of violent extremism, corruption, dependence on the illicit drug trade, and socioeconomic instability that will continually undermine Afghanistan’s ability to strengthen state capacity. In order to overcome these problems, more resources need to be invested in developing Afghanistan’s state institutions in order to provide job opportunities to its citizens, public services, and security. Recent Developments January 2009: Kyrgyzstan announces it will close the American air base at Manas that is used to supply U.S. troops in Afghanistan. February 2009: The United States announces its deployment of 17,000 extra troops to Afghanistan to deal with rising instability. Many other NATO countries also pledge to increase military and nation-building assistance to Afghanistan. March 2009: Afghanistan’s Election Commission rejects President Karzai’s call for an April presidential election, scheduling elections for August instead. Last updated June 22, 2009
Copyright (C) 2009 The Fund for Peace
|